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ABSTRACT 
 
TEMPLE NORTHUP: Implicit Memory and Fluency Effects in Communication Research 
(Under the direction of Francesca Dillman Carpentier) 
 
One of the fundamental questions researchers in mass communication generally and 
advertising specifically want to answer is how to measure the effectiveness of a message.  The 
purpose of this dissertation is to highlight the usefulness of implicit memory measures for doing 
just that.  By using the transfer appropriate processing framework as a guide, this dissertation 
will examine the differences between implicit and explicit memory.  This comparison will be 
done by manipulating both how the ad is encoded and the level of cognitive load the participants 
are under.  Finally, the different types of memory performance will be correlated with attitudes 
to see if and when memory might serve to predict affect. 
In a 2 (encoding: conceptual or perceptual) X 2 (attention: full or divided) between-
subjects experimental design, participants were exposed to a series of advertisements embedded 
on news websites.  After performing a distraction task, participants completed one of the 
following memory measures, depending on which condition they were assigned: conceptual 
implicit memory, perceptual implicit memory, conceptual explicit memory, or perceptual explicit 
memory.  All participants then completed attitudes measures.  
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Results suggest that compared to a control group, significant priming occurred in both the 
conceptual and perceptual implicit memory tests such that those who had seen the 
advertisements performed significantly better on the memory measures than those who did not 
see the advertisements.  Furthermore, for the conceptual measures, how the information was 
encoded mattered, as those who encoded the advertisement conceptually significantly 
outperformed those who had encoded the advertisement perceptually.  More importantly, only 
conceptual implicit memory performance significantly correlated with the attitude measures.   
Overall, this dissertation provides evidence that implicit memory measures are important 
to be used within future advertising research studies.  These measures represent an alternative 
and indirect method to assess advertising effectiveness.  Furthermore, this dissertation adds to 
the literature on fluency effects by suggesting that it is conceptual fluency that mediates the 
relationship between ad exposure and attitudes toward the brands in the ads.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
Every morning, after having arrived at work but before 
actually doing any work, Fred spends at least 30 minutes 
perusing his favorite websites.  He begins with the news, 
scanning such websites as yahoo.com and usatoday.com.  
From there, he moves on to some of his favorite sports 
websites, entertainment websites, and finally, he actually 
begins to do work…  
 
 In the scenario outlined above, Fred begins his day as many people across the 
country probably do.  Although everyone has his or her own personal favorite websites to 
be routinely checked, one thing is almost certainly present across all of those sites: 
advertisements.  Despite the increase in the presence of these ads, it is not entirely clear 
whether they are reaching the consumer as many individuals have developed what has 
been coined “banner blindness” (e.g., Pagendarm & Schaumburg, 2001).  To counteract 
this inattention, website designers have developed new online advertising techniques, 
such as pop-ups and pop-unders, but a great deal of traditional advertising research, 
wherein participants are explicitly asked to recall advertisements to which they had been 
exposed, has found that banner ads are still not entirely effective when it comes to 
demonstrating memory for them (Burke, Hornof, Nilsen, & Gorman, 2005).  More recent 
research, in contrast, has found that banner advertising may actually reach consumers in 
ways not previously realized (Yoo, 2007, 2008, 2010).  According to this new line of 
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research, it is possible that individuals are influenced unconsciously by advertisements 
and these influences could weigh heavily in later consumer decisions (Yang & Roskos-
Ewoldsen, 2007).   
 The understanding that unconscious influences exert pressure on our behavior is 
certainly not a new idea in the world of psychology or consumer behavior (e.g., 
Dijksterhuis, Smith, Baaren, & Wigboldus, 2005).  Many if not most everyday consumer 
decisions (e.g., buying a pack of gum) are surprisingly efficient and occur outside the 
realm of deep conscious processing (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986).  
Such decisions are open to a number of influences that operate at an unconscious—or 
implicit—level.  It is that implicit influence, and implicit memory in particular, that is the 
heart of this present dissertation. 
 Implicit memory is “revealed when previous experiences facilitate performance 
on a task that does not require conscious or intentional recollection of those experiences” 
(Schacter, 1987, p. 501).  For example, if you were exposed to an advertisement for the 
gum Orbit, you would later be more likely to list it as the first brand of gum that comes to 
mind, at least compared to others who had not seen the advertisement.  In this way, the 
“previous experience,” which was the viewing of the advertisement, helped to “facilitate 
performance” on naming the brand “Orbit.”   
 A key component of implicit memory measures—and indeed implicit measures 
more broadly—is that they are indirect in nature.  In other words, the memory measure 
described above did not direct you to think back to a specific episode (the viewing of the 
Orbit ad); rather, the influence of that prior episode was unconscious as you were 
unaware that the prior presentation of Orbit contributed to its likelihood of being 
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mentioned first.  This is an important distinction, as the lack of awareness and the general 
ability for memory to influence thoughts unconsciously closely mimic everyday decision 
processes more than a deliberative, directed use of memory does.   
 Therefore, the purpose of this dissertation is to explore implicit memory effects 
within the advertising context.  Although prior research has demonstrated that implicit 
measures can be useful for gauging advertisement effectiveness (e.g., Parker & Dagnall, 
2009), few studies have situated their research within a theoretical framework specific to 
memory that guided predictions or grounded results.  A major contribution of this current 
endeavor is to do just that by integrating the Transfer Appropriate Processing (TAP) 
framework to mass communication research (Morris, Bransford, & Franks, 1977).  
Although the context of this study will be advertising, this framework can be broadly 
applied to drive predictions related to both explicit and implicit memory for all forms of 
mediated messages.   
 It should be noted that the focus of the present research will relate to implicit 
memory for brand names specifically.  Brand names will be used in the stimulus 
materials and it will be those same brand names that are later tested for with memory 
tests.  Although some could argue that drawing specific attention to the brand name in an 
online advertisement—as will be done here—is not ecologically valid, because this 
framework and line of research is relatively new to advertising, it is important to start 
with the most straight forward research design and add complexity from there.  Once this 
research provides the groundwork for the TAP framework and a basic understanding of 
implicit memory, more ecologically valid research designs can follow. 
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Integral to the TAP framework is the understanding that information can be 
encoded in two distinct manners, either conceptually (meaning-based) or perceptually 
(features-based), and that encoded information can then be tested with memory measures 
that are either conceptual or perceptual in nature.  The TAP framework predicts that the 
performance on any given memory measure will be enhanced to the extent that the 
processing performed at encoding matches the processing engaged at testing.  
Accordingly, within the advertising context, it would be predicted that when 
advertisements are encoded conceptually, conceptual memory measures will show better 
performance than perceptual ones, and vice versa.   
 Having enhanced performance on implicit memory measures might be an 
indicator that an advertisement is influencing an individual even when he or she is not 
aware of that influence and that in turn could be leading to increases in positive affect 
toward the brand in the ad.  This is because enhanced performance on implicit memory 
measures is associated with the increase in accessibility of the primed items in memory.  
Accessibility, which is also known as processing fluency, can then translate into an 
increased liking for an item (e.g., Zajonc, 1968).  In other words, it is possible that being 
exposed to an Orbit advertisement will make an individual like the brand more just 
because it is more accessible in memory.  Therefore, prior exposure to advertisements, in 
addition to showing effects on implicit memory measures, might also lead to an increase 
in positive attitudes toward the brands in the ads. 
 In summary, this dissertation will explore implicit memory measures within the 
advertising context.  Implicit measures, which are indirect in nature, more closely mimic 
many everyday consumer decisions and therefore may be more appropriate measures to 
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use as compared to more traditional explicit ones.  By incorporating the TAP framework, 
it will be possible to make the specific predictions that when information is encoded 
conceptually, performance on conceptually-based memory measures will be enhanced 
whereas when information is encoded perceptually, performance on perceptually-based 
memory measures will be enhanced.  Furthermore, the mere exposure of a brand through 
advertising may lead to an increase in fluency of the brand, which will in turn lead to 
more positive attitudes toward the brand.  These effects may be tempered by the amount 
of attention an individual has to devote to the processing of any given ad, such that a 
division of attention may negatively affect memory performance and therefore not 
translate into any changes of attitudes. 
 Clearly key to this research is an understanding of what is meant by the term 
“implicit.”  The remainder of this chapter will provide an overview of implicit cognition.  
Chapter Two will then provide an overview of memory.  Chapter Three will discuss 
research in advertising that has used some form of implicit memory measures, followed 
by Chapter Four, which will examine the concept of attention.  Attention is an important 
antecedent for almost any media effect to occur—that is, without there being full 
attention paid to a message, it is unlikely that message will yield a large influence.  
Chapter Five will conclude the literature review by highlighting the connection between 
implicit memory and attitudes based on the prior research that has looked at fluency 
effects.   
Implicit and Explicit Cognition 
Conceptually, implicit social cognition is concerned with the unconscious 
processes that underlie judgments, attitudes, and behaviors.  Past research has explored 
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topics ranging from studies demonstrating that doctors who held more negative 
unconscious views of African Americans were then less likely to recommend certain 
treatments for African American patients (Green et al., 2007) to studies showing that 
subliminally induced feelings of guilt resulted in less self indulgent purchase decisions 
(Zemack-Rugar, Bettman, & Fitzsimons, 2007).  The roots of this implicit cognition 
research can be found in the work exploring selective attention and implicit memory (see 
Payne & Gawronski, 2010).   
From the attention paradigm, the focus typically explores whether a thought 
process is automatic or controlled, with the key idea being that information processing 
can be divided into those that are either controlled or automatic in nature.  Controlled 
processes demand attention, are limited in capacity, and are voluntarily initiated; 
automatic processes demand little attention, are unlimited in capacity, and are difficult to 
suppress.  In contrast, the implicit memory paradigm focused much more on conscious 
and unconscious processes rather than controlled and automatic processes.  Although in 
many contexts, the terms controlled/uncontrolled and conscious/unconscious can be used 
interchangeably, it is important to note that they do not necessarily describe the same 
phenomenon.  As will be made evident, a process that is controlled or uncontrolled refers 
to an individual’s ability to influence the processing that occurs as well as the effects of 
that processing; in contrast, a process that is conscious or unconscious is one of which a 
participant is aware or unaware—regardless of whether it can be controlled.  Details of 
this latter perspective will be discussed in greater depth in a later chapter. 
A key component, therefore, of implicit cognition research is distinguishing 
between automatic and controlled processes.  In a highly influential article, Bargh (1994) 
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described the “four horsemen” of automaticity as being lack of awareness, lack of 
intentionality, lack of controllability, and high efficiency or nonreliance on cognitive 
resources.  Although not all four of these qualities need to be present in order for a 
process to be considered “implicit,” and indeed there can be varying levels for each of 
these constructs, a review of each aspect is warranted to further distinguish how implicit 
processes work and to later tie them in with implicit memory. 
Awareness 
   Of the “four horsemen,” awareness—or lack thereof—is often seen as critical, as 
it helps to determine other aspects of implicit cognition, such as intention and control.  
On the surface, being aware or unaware of a process is relatively simple to understand.  If 
a participant is unaware of how an object is influencing a cognitive process, then it can be 
considered an implicit cognition, whereas if a participant is aware of the process, it is 
most likely an explicit cognition.   
 According to Bargh (1994), there are three chief manners in which one can be 
unaware of how a stimulus material is influencing cognition.  The first is absence of 
awareness of the actual stimulus itself.  This typically relates to materials presented 
subliminally, a scenario wherein participants are unaware simply because the 
presentation of the stimulus materials is too fast to consciously process.  More related to 
media studies, a second way that an individual can be unaware is if there is not an 
understanding of how a stimulus material is influencing attitudes, evaluations, or 
behaviors.  For example, if, while Fred is surfing the Internet, he happens to see an ad for 
Orbit, he may be unaware that his decision to buy a pack of gum later was influenced by 
that exposure.  Finally, it is also possible that the lack of awareness of the influence of 
stimulus materials will cause a misattribution of an attitude or behavior to an alternative 
       
 
8 
cause.  Thus after having purchased his pack of Orbit, Fred possibly would indicate an 
alternative reason aside from the banner ad exposure for his purchase—e.g., his last 
experience with the gum was positive.   
 Therefore, not being aware of the influence of stimulus materials is a fundamental 
attribute for a cognitive process to be considered implicit.  If a participant is unaware of a 
stimulus, aware of the stimulus but unaware of its influences, or aware of the stimulus but 
then misattributes the stimulus’s effect to something else, then it can be said that the 
ensuing process is implicit.  Closely tied to awareness are two related concepts: 
intentionality and control.     
Intention & Control 
 For Bargh (1994), intentionality referred to the extent that one has the ability to 
engage in a cognitive process.  This is similar to but uniquely different from control, 
which refers to one’s ability to override or confirm a process once it has been engaged.  
In other words, an unintentional process is one that begins automatically—for instance, 
because of cues in the environment.  Any automatically activated processes would be 
considered implicit, whereas a goal or cognitive process that is engaged consciously 
would be considered explicit.  In contrast, if a process has been initiated automatically or 
unconsciously, the ability to then confirm that process or override the process would 
make it controllable, whereas an inability to stop a cognitive process once it has begun 
would make it uncontrollable. 
 Returning to Fred and his purchase of Orbit, it is likely that having Orbit readily 
accessible in his memory made him have generally more positive feelings toward the 
gum.  The influence of the ad is therefore unintentional, as the positive affect experienced 
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from the prior presentation is automatically experienced.  This is not to necessarily say, 
though, that the positive affect brought on by the exposure is uncontrolled.  If Fred is 
aware that he just saw that Orbit banner ad and that it could be coloring his evaluation of 
Orbit, he could then make a conscious correction to ensure that his feelings are not 
unduly influenced by this increase in accessibility.  In this way, the automatically 
(unintentionally) activated positive affect could be overridden by conscious thought, 
thereby making it controlled.   
Efficiency 
 The final component of an implicit process is that it is typically highly efficient 
and requires little cognitive resources.  This is in contrast to explicit processes, which 
typically require thoughtful, effortful actions on the part of the individual.  In this way, 
implicit processes appear to be effortless and tend to occur rapidly.  It is clear how 
efficiency ties directly back with the previous two constructs: intentionality and control.  
Processes that tend to be unintentional and uncontrolled tend to be highly efficient 
precisely because they are (usually) operating outside of one’s awareness.   
Implicit Processes, Automaticity, and Consumer Behavior 
 Within the consumer behavior literature, there is a great deal of support for the 
assertion that many decisions by consumers are made automatically or at least have an 
automatic component.  In a nice illustration of this, North, Hargreaves, and McKendrick 
(1999) demonstrated that when French music was played in a wine store, there was an 
increase in the sales of French wine; conversely, when German music was played, 
German wine sales increased.  The consumers, presumably, were unaware that the music 
playing was influencing their purchase decision (in that way, the decision-making process 
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certainly lacked awareness and intentionality).  One important question to ask, then, is 
under what circumstances do automatic rather than controlled processes tend to direct 
decisions? 
Although a number of models have been used to explain the relationship between 
automatically activated attitudes and behaviors, one of the most influential is Fazio’s 
(1990) MODE model (Motivation and Opportunity as DEterminants).  This model 
suggests that attitudes influence behavior via two processes—one, a controlled and 
deliberative process; the other, an automatic process.  As the name suggests, motivation 
and opportunity are the key determinants of whether the controlled or the automatic 
process is engaged.  Motivation refers to a participant’s desire or goal to engage in 
effortful processing.  For example, when buying a home, there is probably a greater 
motivation to actively engage in cognitive processing in order to make a deliberative 
decision.  If the decision is which candy bar to buy, there is probably less motivation to 
spend a great deal of time thinking about the decision.  Opportunity simply refers to the 
amount of time an individual has to make any given decision.  If the decision is made 
under time duress, then it can be said that the opportunity to make the decision was 
limited. 
Automatically activated attitudes will drive behavior when either the motivation 
or the opportunity to engage in deliberative processing is low.  Therefore, regardless of 
the amount of opportunity one has, if the motivation is low, automatic attitudes will 
dominate the decision making.  Similarly, even with high motivation levels, if there is not 
adequate opportunity, then automatic processes will lead the way.  However, when 
       
 
11 
motivation and opportunity are high, deliberative processes are likely, which will then 
result in behavior that may or may not match the automatically activated attitudes.   
Fazio’s MODE model (1990) has been very successful in describing and 
predicting a number of different behaviors (e.g., Perugini, Richetin, & Zogmaister, 2010).  
The implication for consumer research is that it predicts that both motivation and 
opportunity influence how “controlled” a decision is.  If there is a high level of 
motivation to make a well-reasoned decision then the process is likely to be controlled.  
However, for most consumer decisions, this strong motivation does not exist.  Low 
involvement decisions in fact dominate most consumer contexts (Laaksonen, 1994; 
Zaichkowsky, 1985) and it can therefore be expected that implicit influences would be 
highly predictive of behavior. 
Similarly, the MODE model (Fazio, 1990) suggests that a lack of opportunity 
would lead to a more automatic process.  Although typically the lack of opportunity is 
experimentally manipulated so that decisions have to occur rapidly, it is also possible that 
consumers limit the amount of time taken simply in order to make the purchase decision 
faster.  In other words, although there may not be a true time limitation imposed on that 
decision of Orbit versus Extra gum, the reality is that nobody would want to spend more 
than a few seconds on that decision and risk the possibility of never getting finished with 
the grocery list.  In that way, opportunity can be seen as limited in the consumer setting 
due to the fact that the decision will be made quickly. 
In sum, because motivation and (perhaps) opportunity are both low for many 
consumer decisions, the MODE model (1990) would predict that implicit processes will 
be highly influential and predictive in determining consumer behavior.  It is important, 
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then, to have a set of measurements that can be effectively used to detect different 
implicit effects.  The purpose of this dissertation is to try to determine if exposure to 
embedded advertisements can induce different types of processing that then leads to 
implicit memory effects, which in turn could translate into changes in attitude toward the 
advertised brand.  Of course, for an individual to be influenced by an ad, several steps 
need to occur.  First, there needs to be an ad that is attended to by the consumer.  Second, 
the attended advertisement needs to be processed and stored.  Third, the ad needs to be 
recalled—implicitly or explicitly.  The next chapter will discuss that final step, recall, in 
terms of explicit and implicit memory.    
  
 
 
 
Chapter Two: Memory 
 Most of the time, if a random individual were asked to define memory, he or 
she would probably give a definition that roughly maps onto what we can more properly 
define as “explicit” memory—that is, a conscious recollection of some past event.  For 
instance, many people report that they have vivid memories of their wedding days, 16th 
birthdays, or other important—and sometimes mundane—events in their lives.  A basic 
and operating definition of explicit memory would be the conscious, deliberative recall or 
recollection of some prior event or learning episode (Mulligan, 2003). 
 In contrast to explicit memory stands implicit memory—a domain that has 
dominated the cognitive psychological literature over the past few decades.  Simply put, 
implicit memory is the unconscious influence of some prior learning episode (Roediger, 
1990).  In other words, it is the memory for some previously encoded information that we 
may not be entirely aware of and it therefore exerts its influence in an unconscious way.   
 Effects related to implicit memory are typically measured by changes in 
behavior caused by prior exposure, with the change in behavior occurring without 
conscious or intentional recollection (Mulligan, 2002).  This change in behavior, which is 
typically reflected by the enhanced performance on an implicit memory measure, is 
called priming.  Although the term priming can refer to many different types of measures 
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or procedures (e.g., Woltz, 2010, for a recent discussion of semantic and repetition 
priming), at its core, priming relates to the activation of some concept in memory which 
in turn makes that concept more readily accessible so that it then influences performance 
on a subsequent task.  This increase in accessibility can be reflected in both cognitive and 
affective measures.   
 Therefore, when conceptually distinguishing between explicit and implicit 
memory, two core differences emerge.  The first is the conscious aspect of the memory.  
Explicit memory relates to memories that one consciously thinks about, whereas implicit 
memories typically operate below the level of consciousness.  If someone sees a really 
compelling story on the evening news about the state of the educational system, it is 
possible that the following day, he or she will remember that story and consciously think 
about it and be concerned with the state of education.  On the other hand, that same 
person may not explicitly be thinking of that story the next day, but when asked about a 
current problem the country faces, will respond that education is very important.  Even 
though that story was not in the conscious memory of the individual, it was still present 
in its influence. 
 Though related, the second difference pertains to the intentionality of the 
retrieval.  In explicit memory, one is intentionally thinking back to some prior episode in 
life and thinking about the details of that event to guide his or her response.  In contrast, 
with implicit memory, the prior event that is influencing the response is doing so without 
any intentional retrieval of it.  Again, using the example of the prior evening’s newscast, 
an intentional retrieval would be generated if asked to directly name the stories that are 
remembered from the previous night.  In contrast, if the influence of the newscast occurs 
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unintentionally, then education will continue to be at the forefront of memory without 
ever specifically thinking back to that episode.  The lack or presence of consciousness 
and intentionality, then, is a key distinction between implicit and explicit memory.   
Dissociations between Explicit and Implicit Memory 
 When statistically significant differences occur between implicit and explicit 
memory—for instance, when there is evidence of implicit memory but no evidence of 
explicit memory—a memory dissociation is said to occur (Roediger & McDermott, 
1993).  These dissociations happen when some variable differentially effects one type of 
memory from the other. 
 In a rather brilliant demonstration of a memory dissociation, Jacoby (1983) had 
participants study words (e.g., COLD) under three different study conditions: a) with no 
context (xxxx-COLD), b) within context (hot-COLD), or c) within a generation context 
(hot-XXXX).  After studying the words under these different conditions, participants 
either performed explicit memory measures or implicit memory measures.  The results 
clearly demonstrate successful memory dissociation manipulations.  For the explicit test, 
there was robust recall for the generation context, less recall when the word was 
presented in context, and much less recall when the word was presented with no context.  
Implicit memory showed the opposite pattern: there was greatest priming in the no 
context condition, less priming for the context condition, and least priming for the 
generation condition.  Jacoby was therefore able to produce dissociations between 
implicit and explicit memory depending on the study condition. 
 This type of dissociation is called a functional dissociation (the two other types 
of dissociations, which do not relate to the current research, are population dissociations, 
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e.g., Warrington & Weiskrantz, 1968, and pharmacological dissociations, e.g., Danion, 
Zimmerman, Willard-Schroeder, Grange, & Silver, 1989).  Functional dissociations are 
caused by differences between or among the encoded information.  The dissociation 
produced in the Jacoby (1983) procedure would be a type of functional dissociation 
because it was the specific manipulation of how each word was studied that produced the 
differences.   
 In fact, the functional dissociation of Jacoby (1983) represents a special type of 
functional dissociation—the cross-over functional dissociation.  It is so named because 
there were opposite effects on implicit versus explicit memory.  In contrast, single 
functional dissociations effect either implicit or explicit memory bit not both.  If the 
attention of the participants is divided when stimulus materials are presented, explicit 
memory suffers, whereas implicit memory typically remains the same (Mulligan & 
Hartman, 1996).  In this way, attention is a variable that causes dissociations between 
explicit and implicit memory.  More on this particular dissociation will be discussed in 
Chapter Four, which looks at attention. 
Theoretical Accounts of Implicit Memory 
 Although there have been a number of different theoretical explanations for 
implicit memory and the dissociations between implicit and explicit memory, the two 
most popular are the multiple memory systems explanation and the Transfer Appropriate 
Processing framework.  As will be seen, each has its own strengths and ability to explain 
the demonstrated dissociations while also not being able to fully explain all of the results. 
 In many ways, the multiple memory systems is the most straight-forward 
explanation in that it argues simply that different memory systems control different types 
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of memory (Schacter, Wagner, & Buckner, 2000).  Research suggests that there are at 
least four types of memory: a) episodic, which is first person remembering of specific 
events, b) semantic, which represents our factual knowledge of the world, c) procedural, 
which relates to our ability to learn a skill, and d) perceptual representational system, 
which relates to our perceptual knowledge.  In general, explicit memory would be related 
to episodic memory, whereas implicit memory can relate to the other three. 
 Although the multiple memory systems approach explains population (and 
pharmacological) dissociations well, it is unable to explain functional dissociations.  
Because functional dissociations are the focus of this research, more time will be spent on 
the second theory, the Transfer Appropriate Processing (TAP) framework (Morris, 
Bransford, & Franks, 1977; Roediger, 1990). 
 According to the TAP framework, memory performance is enhanced to the 
degree that the cognitive processes engaged at test match the cognitive processes engaged 
in study.  Two main types of cognitive processing are said to occur: conceptual 
processing and perceptual processing.  Conceptual processing relates to an analysis of 
meaning of an object whereas perceptual processing relates to an analysis of the surface 
features of an object.  These two different types of processing can occur both during the 
study phase, which would relate to the encoding process, and at test phase, which would 
relate to the retrieval process. 
 When an item is encoded conceptually, some sort of meaningful analysis is 
performed on the object.  In this way, a more thoughtful process occurs when the object 
is being analyzed, a process that tries to assess some sort of meaning from the object.  For 
instance, when looking at an advertisement for Orbit, a conceptual process would be one 
       
 
18 
that looks at the ad and tries to determine how pleasant the advertisement is.  By 
classifying the ad as pleasant or unpleasant, some semantic processes are engaged and the 
item is said to be encoded conceptually.  In contrast, when an item is encoded 
perceptually, the analysis of the item is conducted at a much more superficial level, as 
only surface features of the item are considered.  For example, when looking at the Orbit 
advertisement, it is possible that the only thing noticed is that the ad uses really bright 
colors.  In this way, an analysis of the advertisement is only done to the surface features 
of the ad rather than an analysis of what the advertisement’s meaning is.   
 In the same way that items can be encoded conceptually or perceptually, 
memory tests can also be conceptual or perceptual in nature.  A conceptual memory test 
would ask questions that force participants to think about the semantic meaning of the 
question and response in order to answer the question.  A perceptual memory test, on the 
other hand, would only require a participant to look at the surface features of the question 
in order to come up with a response.  The TAP framework argues that when testing and 
encoding processing match, memory performance is enhanced.  In other words, if 
encoding is performed in a conceptual manner, performance on a conceptual memory test 
will be better than performance on a perceptual memory test.  Similarly, if encoding is 
conducted in a perceptual manner, performance will be better on perceptually based tests 
and worse on conceptually based ones.  
 As an example of different encoding and testing procedures, let us now return to 
the Jacoby (1983) study.  Considering first the encoding conditions, for those participants 
who were exposed to the “generation” context, wherein they were given a word (e.g., hot) 
and had to produce its opposite (cold), it is clear that the encoding process performed on 
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the generated would be conceptual in nature.   After all, it is nearly impossible to think of 
an opposite of one word without thinking about the meaning of the word.  Therefore, 
when “cold” is generated as the opposite of “hot,” a conceptual process must occur.  In 
contrast, when the words are presented without any context, no analysis is likely 
performed on the word outside of a cursory analysis of the word to establish what word is 
being presented.  In other words, when “cold” is flashed on a computer screen, it is 
unlikely that a participant would semantically analyze the word unless instructed to do so.  
Therefore, those items are presumably perceptually processed.   
 Similarly, the specific tests used were also conceptual and perceptual in nature.  
For the explicit test, participants were given a recognition test that asked participants if 
they recognized a presented word as being one from their earlier study phase.  A 
recognition measure is conceptual in nature (as you have to analyze the meaning of the 
word in order to determine if you saw it earlier) and it therefore fits the TAP framework 
that those who had encoded information conceptually performed well on this conceptual 
measure whereas those who had encoded the words in a perceptual manner performed 
worse.  For the implicit test, a perceptual identification procedure was used, which 
flashes a word momentarily (33 ms) and asks for participants to recognize the word.  
Because the word is flashed at a rate that makes it nearly impossible to identify, only a 
feature analysis can be performed, which makes it a perceptual test.  It is not surprising, 
then, that those who had encoded the words perceptually performed better on the test than 
those who encoded the word conceptually. 
 According to the TAP framework and well illustrated in the Jacoby experiment 
(1983), most explicit memory tests rely on conceptual processing whereas most implicit 
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memory tests rely on perceptual processing.  Indeed, in the Jacoby procedure, the explicit 
test was conceptual whereas the implicit test was perceptual.  Because of this, the type of 
cognitive processing represents a confound to explicit and implicit memory dissociations.  
In other words, it could be the difference in processing that is causing the dissociation 
between explicit and implicit memory.  It is necessary, then, to use both conceptual and 
perceptual memory tests to determine if the processing type is the source of the 
dissociation.   
Conceptual and Perceptual Explicit and Implicit Memory Measures 
 Researchers investigating the TAP framework have identified many implicit 
and explicit tests that can be conceptual or perceptual in nature.  Although most explicit 
tests typically used are conceptual in nature, as will be seen, it is not difficult to modify 
directions in order to turn them into implicit tests.  After all, the key distinctions between 
implicit and explicit measures are whether the use of memory is conscious and 
intentional.  Therefore, assuring that the use of memory is unconscious and unintentional 
will make any explicit test implicit. 
 For implicit memory, common perceptually based tests include the word-
fragment completion (O_b_t for Orbit), the word-stem completion (Or___), lexical 
decision making (is Orbit a brand or non-brand using response latencies), and perceptual 
identification (through either degraded images, masked images, or briefly presented 
images).  Each test is perceptual in nature because it strictly requires an analysis of the 
surface features of the word in order to respond.  For example, for the word-fragment 
completion procedure, all that is required to respond to the word fragment “O_b_t” is to 
determine that using an “r” and “i” will create the brand; no analysis of what “Orbit” 
       
 
21 
means is required.  The measure is typically implicit in nature because there are no 
instructions that point back to the study phase to help clue in the participants that they 
have seen the words before.  In this way, any enhanced ability to complete the word 
fragments can be attributed to the prior presentation. 
 Common conceptual implicit memory tests include category-exemplar 
production, general knowledge questions, and word associations.  Category-exemplar 
production measures typically ask participants to name the first item (or items) from a 
category that comes to mind.  For instance, a participant could be asked to name the first 
brand of gum that comes to mind, with the idea being that items previously encountered 
(the ad for Orbit) will make it more likely that Orbit will be listed first compared to those 
who had not seen the ad.  Because these measures require an analysis of meaning (that is, 
an analysis of what the category “gum” means and then what item is the first to come to 
mind that fits into that category), they are considered conceptual in nature.  Furthermore, 
because there is no direct reference to the earlier study episode, they are implicit in 
nature. 
 For explicit memory tests, common conceptual tests include cued recall, free 
recall, and recognition.  Using cued recall as an example, participants could be asked 
what gum advertisement was presented earlier.  This measure is conceptually based 
because it requires participants to think semantically about any prior ads that they 
remember.  In other words, they are thinking about the ads that they saw earlier and doing 
an analysis to see which, if any, relate to gum.  This measure is also explicit in nature 
because it is directing participants to think back to their prior exposure.  These directions 
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are in contrast to the conceptually based implicit measures described above where no 
mention is made of any prior presentation. 
 Though rare, it is also possible to have a perceptually based explicit test.  This 
is typically done by using an implicit measure but varying the instructions to indicate that 
the answers could be coming from the study episode.  With a word-fragment completion 
task, participants could be given the same word fragment mentioned above (O_b_t), only 
instead of merely asking for the fragment to be completed with a brand name, 
participants could be told that word fragment can be completed with a brand from an 
advertisement previously encountered.  In this way, the measure is still perceptual in 
nature because participants are still only trying to analyze the surface meaning of the 
fragment, but it is also explicit because participants will be directing their memory back 
to the study episode in order to help complete the fragment. 
 For this dissertation, a conceptual and perceptual implicit and explicit test will 
be used.  For the conceptual implicit measure, a category exemplar production task will 
be employed, whereas for the perceptual implicit measure, a word-fragment completion 
task will be used.  For the conceptual explicit measure, a cued-recall procedure will be 
used, whereas for the conceptual implicit measure, a cued word fragment completion task 
will be used.  These specific tests will be used because they are closely related in nature 
and differ chiefly by instructions.  For the conceptual measures, the implicit test will ask 
for the first brand of (gum) that comes to mind to be listed and the explicit test will ask 
for the brand of gum from exposure to be listed.  These tests are similarly conceptual in 
nature and so the differences should be that one is direct in nature whereas the other is 
indirect.  Similarly, the perceptual memory measures are literally identical except for the 
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directions.  Having the tests match in this way should make comparisons between 
implicit and explicit as well as perceptual and conceptual measures more meaningful. 
Awareness  
 In order for the implicit tests to remain implicit, an underlying assumption is 
that they are indirect in nature and therefore the participants are not aware of a 
connection between the memory measures and the prior study phase.  If participants do 
become aware of the connection, they may begin to use intentional and conscious 
recollection strategies (that is, explicit strategies) in order to answer the implicit 
measures.  This phenomenon, known as explicit contamination, threatens the validity of 
implicit measures (McKone, 1997). 
 An awareness questionnaire can be used to determine whether participants are 
test aware (Bowers & Schacter, 1990).  A typical awareness questionnaire has 
increasingly specific questions that try to determine the level of awareness of each 
participant.  In a series of studies, Barnhardt and Geraci (2008) determined that these 
awareness questionnaires are valid measures and, if anything, are conservative in their 
estimate of unaware participants.  In other words, the questionnaires may put many who 
were not using intentional memory or were not aware of the connection as being test-
aware.  However, the fact that these are conservative only points to the worth of their use, 
as they are highly unlikely to keep any participants who were aware in the unaware 
group. 
 The importance of making this distinction between aware and unaware 
participants was successfully demonstrated in a series of studies by Mace (2003).  Mace 
categorized participants into three groups: test unaware, test-informed (those aware of the 
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connection but who did not use any intentional retrieval strategies to answer the implicit 
questions), or test-aware (those who were aware of the connection and used explicit 
strategies to respond).  In his research, for those who encoded the stimuli in a perceptual 
manner, there were no differences among the unaware, informed, or aware conditions; 
however, in the conceptual encoding conditions, there were differences between the 
unaware and informed and also between the unaware and aware conditions, with the 
informed and aware conditions typically demonstrating more priming.  Therefore, under 
certain conditions, there can be what appears to be a robust priming effect that might be 
overstated or non-existent if explicit contamination is considered.  Consequently, it is 
critical to use a post-test questionnaire to determine the level of awareness so that groups 
can be split into aware and unaware groups. 
 Although implicit memory measures have been developed and used frequently 
in cognitive psychology literature over the past few decades, they have not been used 
extensively in communication research generally or advertising research specifically.  
Because this dissertation plans on addressing implicit memory within an advertising 
context, an overview of the advertising literature that has used implicit memory measures 
will be conducted next.  
  
 
 
 
Chapter Three: Implicit Memory in the Advertising Literature 
 Over the past decade, the advertising literature has paid a slow but steadily 
increasing amount of attention to implicit memory.  This research has provided some 
interesting and compelling results that will be discussed below.  It has also laid the 
groundwork necessary to establish implicit memory measures as being appropriate for 
use in the advertising context.  The time is now ripe for a strong theoretical framework to 
be applied to this prior research, which can in turn drive future predictions.  The TAP 
framework (Morris, Bransford, & Franks, 1977) will do just that, as most research 
conducted thus far can be explained through its lens.  Although a full review of all 
implicit memory research in the advertising literature is outside the scope of this chapter, 
a number of key studies will be highlighted that are representative of the types of 
contexts within which this research has taken place, experimental manipulations that have 
occurred, and outcomes measures that were most often used.   
Overview of Past Research 
 In an early example of implicit memory for advertising research, Shapiro and 
Krishnan (2001) investigated implicit and explicit memory for print advertisements 
displayed in magazines.  In their experiments, they included two theoretically important 
manipulations.  The first was a manipulation of attention.  As will be discussed in the 
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next chapter, many memory paradigms (e.g., Lang’s (2000) limited capacity approach) 
suggest that dividing attention reduces one’s ability to encode an item, leaving little 
memory for that item.  Based on this framework, the authors predicted that dividing 
attention at presentation of the advertisements would hurt explicit memory; however, 
they predicted no such effect on implicit memory based upon the prior research that 
suggested that it remains intact even under divided attention conditions. 
 The second manipulation used related to the timing of the test.  In one condition, 
participants were tested immediately following exposure; in another, they were tested one 
week later.  Past research (e.g., Tulving, Schacter, & Stark, 1982) has suggested that 
priming for implicit memory can still demonstrate robust effects even after a long delay.  
In contrast, explicit measures show delay effects wherein participants have little memory 
for what was seen earlier.  Based on this past research, the authors predicted that explicit 
memory for the advertisements would decrease over time whereas implicit memory 
would remain roughly the same. 
 Shapiro and Krishnan (2001) used a conceptually driven explicit measure of 
recognition and a perceptually driven implicit measure of forced choice.  In this type of 
implicit measure, participants are forced to choose between two products, one to which 
participants had been exposed earlier and the other being new.  Results for the 
recognition measure demonstrated strong performance in the full attention, immediate 
test, whereas performance significantly suffered when attention was divided or testing 
was delayed.  It is important to note that significant priming results were obtained in all 
conditions for the implicit measure.  These results were promising because they 
demonstrated a dissociation between implicit and explicit memory depending on attention 
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and time of test.  Under conditions that traditionally hurt explicit memory performance, 
implicit memory was still strong.  This research helped to create the argument that 
relying solely on explicit measures may not be a sound decision. 
Yang, Roskos-Ewoldsen and colleagues (2006, 2007) made further significant 
contributions to implicit memory research when they investigated what is perhaps the 
most applied use for implicit memory: product placements within movies and 
advertisements placed in video games.  It is easy to understand the interest in both of 
these.  For movies, it is common practice to have companies pay to have their products 
featured.  However, it has been difficult to establish the efficacy of this strategy with 
explicit measures alone, as products merely featured in the background will almost never 
be recalled after the movie.  Of similar applied importance is their research looking at in-
game advertising for video games.  Video games bring in more money per year than any 
other form of entertainment, reach a larger audience, and are particularly popular with 
younger demographics that advertisers often want to reach.  Being able to demonstrate 
that having products featured within the context of a game enhances memory 
performance would be a promising result for advertisers.   
 In their experiments looking at product placement in movies, Yang and Roskos-
Ewoldsen (2007) used what they describe as the “level of placement” within the movie as 
their key manipulation.  They defined this manipulation in terms of how noticeable the 
product was within the movie and operationalized it to have three levels: (a) those 
products that are in the background, (b) those products that are used by a main character, 
and (c) those products that have a specific tie-in with the story.  Each level should be 
increasingly noticeable for a viewer and, based on the landscape model framework, 
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predicted better explicit memory for items that were central to the story than those that 
were not.  Citing previous research in implicit memory, they also predicted that implicit 
memory performance for items placed in the movies will be better for those who watch 
the clip than for those who do not (the control group). 
 To measure memory, Yang and Ewoldsen (2007) used a conceptually driven 
explicit test (product recognition—was the product present or not?) and a perceptually 
driven implicit test (word-fragment completion).  As predicted, for the explicit test, only 
those products that were heavily featured in a storyline were recognized as being present 
in the movie.  Unlike the recognition test, though, the word-fragment completion test 
showed robust priming at all three levels.  These results replicated the previous work of 
Yang, Roskos-Ewoldsen, Dinu, and Arpan (2006), who similarly found very low 
recognition for those brands placed within video games whereas implicit memory 
performance was robust.  Together, these results are encouraging, as they demonstrated 
that for an implicit memory measure, priming can be detected in situations where there is 
virtually no explicit memory for what was seen.  In this way, the authors were detecting 
memory in situations in which prior research would have demonstrated none.   
 In a more recent series of studies, Yoo (2007, 2008, 2010) investigated implicit 
memory for banner ads seen on the Internet.  He, too, used theoretically interesting 
manipulations.  In one study, Yoo manipulated what he referred to as “processing effort.”  
In the design, participants were exposed to a webpage with a single news story on it and a 
banner ad.  In the low processing effort condition, participants were told that they would 
be asked a question after looking at the webpage that was strictly about the story.  In the 
high processing condition, the participants were told that they would be asked about the 
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entire webpage, including any advertisements.  In another study, Yoo also directed 
attention toward the ad or let the exposure be “incidental” and merely a reflection of 
seeing the ad.  In both cases, the manipulations are similar to those that relate to attention, 
as it can be argued that participant attention is higher when directed toward the banner ad 
than when not directed toward the banner ad. 
Yoo (2007, 2008, 2010) used two conceptually driven explicit measures 
(recognition and recall) and one implicit measure (word-fragment completion) to measure 
memory for banner ads.  As predicted, regardless of how the banner ad was processed 
(that is, whether participants were directed or not directed to look at it), robust priming 
occurred for the implicit measure.  Similarly predicted was better performance on explicit 
tests when the banner ads were specifically attended.  These results demonstrate that 
memory dissociations can occur within the online environment and that priming can 
occur even when attention is directed away from the stimuli. 
Many other contexts and measures have been used in implicit memory research 
within the advertising field (e.g., Coates, Butler, & Berry, 2004, 2006; Finlay, Marmurek, 
& Morton, 2005; Marks, Tidwell, & Spence, 1991).  Although all of these examples and 
the ones outlined above provide compelling research, they are similar in that they 
generally use some theory to drive predictions related to explicit memory but rely solely 
on past research to drive predictions about implicit memory.  In other words, predictions 
related to explicit memory were theoretically driven whereas the predictions related to 
implicit memory were data driven.  The time is appropriate, therefore, to introduce the 
TAP framework to advertising research as it will help ground results.  Indeed, all of the 
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previous examples discussed confirm the predictions the TAP framework would have 
made. 
Considering first the research of Shapiro and Krishnan (2001), the TAP 
framework predicts that the division of attention only affects conceptually driven 
processes.  Therefore, their results of conceptual explicit measure performing poorly 
under a divided condition is unsurprising; similarly unsurprising is that the perceptual 
implicit measure would show no differences regardless of the level of attention.  Shapiro 
and Krishnan also manipulated time.  As with attention, the TAP framework would 
generally predict that perceptually driven processes are less affected by delays than 
conceptually driven measures.  Therefore, their results conform to this prediction, as only 
the conceptual explicit memory test was influenced by time. 
The results of Yang, Roskos-Ewoldson and colleagues (2006, 2007) also support 
the TAP framework.  In their product placement study, they found that only when the 
product was heavily featured was there explicit memory for the product.  It is easy to 
understand why: products that are integrated into the storyline would be used and be 
critical to the development of the story.  It is likely, then, that those products would be 
thought about in a conceptual manner.  In other words, if a particular cell phone is critical 
to saving a hero from disaster, it is likely that someone would pay more attention to that 
specific product.  When using a conceptual explicit measure, only those products that 
were encoded conceptually should be remembered, which is exactly what was found.  
Considering the perceptually driven implicit measure, priming was found across levels of 
placement.  This again conforms to the TAP framework.  In all conditions, there was at 
least some encoding of the product, even if entirely superficially.  The surface analysis of 
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the product would be a perceptual process, meaning the items were all encoded at least 
partially perceptually.  When tested later with a perceptual implicit memory test, it only 
follows that there would be priming for all levels. 
Finally, the research conducted by Yoo (2007, 2008, 2010) generally followed 
predictions that could have been made by the TAP framework.  As expected, regardless 
of how the banner ad was processed, implicit (perceptual) priming occurred; however, 
only when the ad was specifically looked at was there any enhanced performance on an 
explicit measure.  In all likelihood, when the participants were not directed to look at the 
ad, it was processed perceptually, and when they were told they may be asked about the 
ad, it was processed conceptually.  This would explain why performance was enhanced 
on the conceptual explicit test only when participants were directed toward the ad. 
Building Upon the Past: The Future of Implicit Memory Research in Advertising 
 In summary, a small but promising amount of research has been conducted thus 
far examining implicit memory in an advertising context.  This research has set the stage 
for the next phase of memory research, which is to apply a theoretical framework to help 
contextualize implicit results and drive predictions.  The TAP framework will do just 
that, as it both explains previous results and can be used to derive future hypotheses.   In 
the current study, specific instructions should encourage participants to encode the ads in 
a perceptual or conceptual manner.   
 Based on these manipulations, the following hypotheses can be made: 
H1A: For participants who encode an advertisement conceptually, there will be increased 
performance on an implicit conceptual memory measure compared to those who 
encode the advertisement perceptually as well as compared to a control group. 
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H1B: For participants who encode an advertisement conceptually, there will be increased 
performance on an explicit conceptual memory measure compared to those who 
encode the advertisement perceptually. 
H2A: For participants who encode an advertisement perceptually, there will be increased 
performance on an implicit perceptual memory measure compared to those who 
encode the advertisements conceptually as well as compared to a control group. 
H2B: For participants who encode an advertisement perceptually, there will be increased 
performance on an explicit perceptual memory measure compared to those who 
encode the advertisements conceptually. 
 As mentioned above, one manipulation that is often performed in memory 
research (and communication research in general) is to divide attention.  It is important, 
then, to look at attention and some of the ways it has been conceptualized.     
  
 
 
 
Chapter Four: Attention 
For any stimulus materials to have any effect on an individual, a necessary first 
step is for the message to be attended.  In other words, no matter how persuasive, 
compelling, or impressive stimulus materials may be, if the participant does not read, 
watch, hear, or in some other way process them, they will have no effect.  Therefore, an 
extraordinarily important concept to understand is attention, for without some level of 
attention, this present research would almost certainly fail.  As an important starting 
point, the theoretical frameworks used to conceptualize attention will be reviewed.   
Theoretical Frameworks of Attention 
 It is possible to think about attention in at least two separate but equally important 
ways.  The first type of attention relates to an initial selection process wherein an 
individual actively or automatically selects items to process, whereas the second type 
relates to the continued allocation of resources in order to attend to a specific stimulus (or 
stimuli).  A different terminology for those types of attention would be phasic attention 
and tonic attention, where phasic attention describes short-term changes in attention and 
tonic attention relates to on-going changes in attention and resource allocation.   
The first type of attention involves the selection of certain stimuli among many 
toward which attention might be directed.  In other words, if an individual is scanning the 
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Yahoo homepage, there will be any number of items to look at ranging from banner ads, 
to images, to headlines and beyond.  Although it is possible to try to take in a general 
overview of the entire webpage, it is more likely that one’s vision will focus on specific 
elements of the webpage and move from area to area.  This process of selecting 
information to specifically attend to is the first way to conceptualize attention. 
 The second type of attention relates to the process of focusing cognitive resources 
on a specific task.  This is typically a more ongoing and effortful process.  When 
surveying the Yahoo homepage mentioned above, perhaps there is a link to a story that is 
of particular interest.  After clicking on the link, one is taken to a new page that has the 
story but also includes other visuals that accompany the story, links to other stories, new 
images, and so forth.  It takes cognitive resources to focus attention solely on the text of 
the article of interest and prevent the focus of attention from drifting to other areas.  
Clearly, maintaining focus is a distinct type of attention from the initial selection 
described first. 
 In a classic example from psychology that demonstrates the effects of both types 
of attention (Cherry, 1953), participants put on headphones that had two different 
messages being played—one in each ear.  The participants were told that they had to 
“shadow” one of the messages by repeating whatever was being said.  In this way, the 
participants were selecting or directing their attention toward that channel while ignoring 
the other.  The results indicated that participants could tell very little about what was 
being said in the non-selected channel, often only being able to tell surface features (e.g., 
if it was a human or animal sound).  Furthermore, the more difficult the shadowing 
procedure, the less information from the non-attended channel could be processed, often 
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to the point where the participants’ names, swear words, and a host of other sounds 
would be completely missed.  The implications from these early studies are twofold and 
relate to both types of attention: first, we have the ability to direct our attention toward 
one item and away from another; and second, when we focus our attention on one item, 
the processing of other stimuli suffers. 
 According to Broadbent (1958), a two-stage approach of information processing 
explains selective attention.  In the first stage, he argued that all information from the 
senses is processed but only superficially and that information is put into a “sensory 
store.”  The information in the sensory store is then selected or “filtered” and sent to a 
limited-capacity store where it can be rehearsed to be maintained and eventually stored or 
where it can be forgotten.  In other words, most if not all of the information on the Yahoo 
homepage is processed in the sensory store, but only certain information (e.g., the 
headline text) is then selected and filtered into the limited-capacity store to be examined 
further.  Similarly, when listening to headphones that each have their own messages, both 
channels are processed superficially in the sensory store but only the channels we select 
to listen to are filtered into the limited-capacity store.  Critical to understanding these two 
stages, therefore, is the determination of which attributes of stimuli create scenarios most 
favorable to being selected for further attention and processing. 
 As evidenced by the name, Broadbent’s limited-capacity store is unable to hold 
and process unlimited information.  This notion was picked up by Kahneman (1973), 
whose central tenet was that attention is limited in overall capacity and our ability to 
carry out multiple tasks depends on how many resources they demand.  The idea that our 
attention and cognitive resources are limited was shepherded into the communication 
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field most eloquently by Lang (2000), whose influential limited-capacity theory is one of 
the most cited in all of communication research.  
 According to Lang (2000), people are information processors and the basic 
components of processing are to perceive stimuli, attend to those stimuli, and then turn 
them into mental representations, which can later be reproduced in the same or altered 
forms.  Although we are all information processors, we all also have a limited and fixed 
pool of mental resources and attention that can be used at any given moment.  Whereas 
certain processes occur without conscious volition, which would relate to the preattentive 
processing of surface features, others are controlled processes and these require selected 
attention and resources. 
 For Lang (2000), three main subprocesses relate to memory, all of which demand 
attention: encoding, storage, and retrieval.  The encoding process relates to the attending 
of a specific stimulus and focusing attention and processing resources on it.  This 
focusing of attention can be controlled based on an individual’s motives or goals, or it 
can be automatic, such as when an orienting response occurs.  An orienting response 
occurs whenever important, unique, novel, unexpected, or new stimuli are encountered 
(Lang, 2006).  For instance, when scanning the Yahoo homepage, the onset of an 
animated advertisement might cause an orienting response to occur because the animated 
ad would be a new item to be processed (in fact, animated ads have been shown to cause 
orienting responses, see Lang, Borse, Wise, & David, 2002, though they do not always 
appear to do so, Diao & Sundar, 2004).  Dawson, Filion, and Schell (1989) demonstrated 
that the orienting response causes an allocation of processing resources.  In contrast, an 
individual’s motives can cause specific stimuli to be selected, thereby making it a 
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controlled process.  If an individual is motivated to read stories about the economy, then 
any headline that has a reference to the economy will be selected for further processing.  
In that way, all of the headlines are entering into the sensory store and being processed 
superficially, but only the headlines that meet the goal of this individual are being 
selected. 
Once an item has been selectively attended and processed, it can be moved into 
storage.  This process requires attention if it is to be stored in an effective manner.  Lang 
(2006) conceptualizes storage as the linking of newly encoded information with 
previously encoded information.  The more links between the new and old information, 
the better the storage will be.  If not enough allocation of resources occurs while storage 
is occurring, the item will become poorly stored and potentially inaccessible.  Lang 
argues that motivational relevance leads to the automatic allocation of resources to aid in 
storage. 
Finally, retrieval also takes attention and demands resources because it is 
conceived to be an effortful process of directing a search to find specific information.  
Resource allocation can again occur through both controlled and automatic processes.  
Automatic processes are most likely to take the form of spreading activation.  According 
to Lang (2006), memory can be considered bits of information that are linked (from 
storage) to each other.  When one item is activated, then it also activates related and 
linked items thereby causing a spreading activation to occur among linked concepts.   
In Lang’s (2000) conceptualization, each of these processes occurs 
simultaneously and continuously and draws from the same pool of fixed resources.  
Whenever the resource demands are more than the resources available, cognitive 
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overload occurs.  This then leads to performance suffering on one, two, or all three of the 
memory processes.  For Lang, each of these processes relates to different memory 
measures and so it is possible to determine which process is being allocated the most 
resources based on the different measures.  For encoding, Lang argues that a recognition 
memory measure is most appropriate.  Recognition is the most sensitive memory 
measurement because it provides the item to be recognized to the participant and 
therefore provides clues that are much more evident than other memory measures.  For 
storage, Lang recommends cued recall as the most appropriate measure as it is the next 
most sensitive.  In cued recall, one specific piece of information is provided as a clue to 
help aid the recall of the item.  Finally, for retrieval, Lang recommends free recall.  This 
least sensitive memory measure indexes how well an individual can recall a piece of 
information without any cues. 
Implications for the Present Research 
 It is evident through past research that only certain items are selected for further 
processing and the selection of these items can occur through either a controlled process 
(e.g., motivationally driven) or through an automatic process (e.g., an orienting response).  
Once an item is selected for further processing, there is only a limited capacity for 
allocating attention such that if resources are stressed, attention will not be properly paid 
and ultimately there will be no memory for the item.  Therefore, in a most basic sense, 
both the initial selection and then subsequent processing must occur for there to be 
memory of a stimulus.   In the present research, selection of items will occur through a 
controlled process as the participants will be directed to attend to an item on the screen.   
       
 
39 
 According to Lang’s (2000) theory, when cognitive processes are overloaded, 
memory performance will suffer.  A common procedure for overloading participants is to 
divide their attention.  Although there are many ways one can accomplish this goal, one 
relatively simple yet effective way to do this is to have participants memorize a five-digit 
number string before encoding occurs.  Past research (Mulligan & Stone, 1999) shows 
this to be a successful manipulation in disrupting certain cognitive processes.  The 
limited-capacity approach therefore would predict that whenever attention is divided, 
memory for the item would suffer. 
 In direct contrast to this approach, though, the TAP framework predicts that when 
attention is divided, only conceptually-based measure performance suffers whereas the 
perceptually-based measures remain relatively unaffected (Mulligan & Hartman, 1996).  
Whereas the limited-capacity framework predicts that all memory performance will 
suffer when attention is divided, the TAP framework predicts that only conceptually 
driven processes will suffer.  Therefore, the following competing hypotheses are 
proposed: 
H3A: According to the limited-capacity memory framework, dividing attention at 
encoding will decrease the performance on any memory measure—explicit or 
implicit, conceptual or perceptual—compared to the performance of those who 
have not had their attention divided. 
H3B: According to the TAP framework, dividing attention at encoding will decrease later 
memory performance when the measure is conceptual in nature; perceptually 
driven measures will show no decreases in performance due to divided attention. 
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Although showing significant results on implicit memory measures, whether 
conceptual or perceptual in nature, is an important outcome for any advertising campaign, 
of ultimate importance for the brands that are creating those campaigns is for attitudes to 
improve for those products.  In addition to having their brands “come to mind” first, as 
would be indicated by a conceptual implicit memory test, prior exposure could also lead 
to an increase in positive affect toward the brand.  Those effects are what shall be 
considered next.  
  
 
 
 
Chapter Five: Implicit Memory, Fluency Effects, and Attitudes 
 One of the key elements of this dissertation is trying to determine not only the 
conditions in which implicit memory performance will be enhanced within the 
advertising context, but also to determine if an increase in fluency as indicated by 
implicit memory measures will translate into an increase in overall affect toward the 
primed brands.  The underlying assumption in fluency research is that whenever someone 
is exposed to a stimulus item, that item then becomes more accessible in memory.  This 
increase in accessibility then enhances the ease with which the item can be identified—
which is known as processing fluency.  Past research has suggested that processing 
fluency is affectively positive so that when an item has increased fluency, there are 
generally more positive attitudes toward that item (e.g., Hansen & Wanke, 2009).   
 Just as cognitive processing can, according to the TAP model, be either 
conceptually or perceptually based, processing fluency can also be conceptually or 
perceptually based (Tulving & Schacter, 1990).  Mirroring conceptual and perceptual 
processing, conceptual fluency relates to the ease with which an item comes to mind and 
how quickly meaning can be processed, whereas perceptual fluency reflects how easily 
and quickly the surface features of an item can be processed.  For example, if a 
participant is exposed to an ad for Orbit, conceptual fluency would be reflected in how 
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quickly and readily that item comes to mind when the category of gum is considered, 
whereas perceptual fluency would be reflected in how quickly an image of Orbit could be 
identified (e.g., if flashed momentarily on a screen).   
As is evident, the ideas of processing fluency and implicit memory are very 
similar.  Butler and Berry (2004) highlighted that the mere exposure effect (discussed 
below) and implicit memory research have been conducted independent of each other yet 
often reference one another.  They argue that because fluency effects tend to occur in 
situations where no reference is made to the learning episode during the test phase, the 
procedure can be considered an implicit memory procedure.  Because of this, the mere 
exposure effect, and other fluency effects, can be considered an effect based on implicit 
memory, which in turn is rooted in an increase in perceptual or conceptual fluency. 
Although the effects of perceptual fluency are well-documented and clearly 
affectively positive in nature (e.g., Mandler, Nakamura, & Zandt, 1987), it is much less 
clear how conceptual fluency interacts with affect.  The little research that does exist (Lee 
& Labroo, 2004) suggests that conceptual fluency is potentially affectively positive and 
behaves in a similar manner as perceptual fluency.   
 A number of different effects in the literature relate to increases in fluency.  Two 
specific ones that are related to the present research will be discussed here: the mere 
exposure effect and the sleeper effect.   Before those are discussed, a theoretical model 
will be detailed that accounts for these effects. 
Perceptual Fluency/Attributional Model 
 The perceptual fluency/attributional model, developed by Bornstein and 
D’Agonstino (1992, 1994), suggests that repeated exposure to a stimulus results in 
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increased perceptual fluency for that stimulus.  That fluency, which they argue is the 
same fluency that enhances performance on implicit memory priming tasks, translates 
into an increase of positive affect.  Furthermore, when people experience that increase in 
fluency, they do not attribute the fluency to the prior presentation of the stimulus; rather, 
they will generate an alternative but feasible explanation for the feeling of familiarity.  In 
this way, they will misattribute the reason for their fluency. 
 For this model, Bornstein and D’Agonstino (1992, 1994) articulate the importance 
of awareness as a key to understanding the effects of this increased fluency—an  
awareness of the prior presentation can dampen or extinguish the increase of positive 
affect.  For instance, when stimuli are presented subliminally, there is generally a robust 
and large increase in positive affect toward those stimuli.  By definition, a subliminal 
presentation is one wherein the participant lacks awareness of what was seen and so a 
connection between that subliminal presentation and later fluency would not be possible.  
In contrast, for items presented supraliminally, there still may be an increase in positive 
affect, but that increase is typically not as pronounced as when the presentation is 
conducted subliminally.  According to Bornstein and D’Agonstino, an awareness of the 
connection between presentation and fluency explains this reduction. 
 It is important to note, though, that Bornstein and D’Agonstino (1992, 1994) did 
not differentiate between conceptual and perceptual processing and how that distinction 
could lead to differences between conceptual and perceptual fluency.  After all, their 
model is called the perceptual fluency/attributional model, so a consideration of how 
conceptual fluency plays into the picture is not entirely clear.  It can be assumed, then, 
that when they discuss implicit memory as being the basis of fluency effects, it is most 
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likely implicit memory as reflected by perceptual encoding or testing.  A key question 
that remains, then, is the relationship between conceptual fluency and affective responses.   
The Mere Exposure Effect 
 Perhaps the most studied and discussed fluency effect is the mere exposure effect 
(Zajonc, 1968).  The mere exposure effect refers to the increase in positive affect for a 
previously encountered stimulus, with the increase in affect being directly attributed to 
the prior exposure.  According to the perceptual fluency/attributional model (Bornstein & 
D’Agonstino 1992, 1994), the increase in perceptual fluency caused by those prior 
exposures causes the increase in positive affect to occur.   
 In one important study, Mandler, Nakamura, and Zandt (1987) displayed ten 
irregularly shaped octagons for 2 milliseconds to each participant.  Participants were then 
shown pairs of octagons, one that had been seen before and one new.  Some had to 
indicate which octagon of the two they recognized whereas others had to indicate which 
they preferred.  Consistent with the mere exposure effect, recognition of the octagons was 
performed at chance but there was a significantly above chance preference for the 
octagon that had been subliminally displayed.   
Mandler and colleagues (1987) also divided participants into two other important 
groups: one that judged brightness, the other darkness.  For those groups, the octagons 
that had been previously displayed were judged as being either brighter or darker than the 
octagons not seen.  This is extremely important because it lends support to the perceptual 
fluency/attributional model, as it demonstrates that the mere exposure effect is not limited 
to judgments of liking or preference.  Instead, this increase in perceptual fluency (and 
here, because the items were presented subliminally, the results can only be attributed to 
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perceptual and not conceptual fluency) led to a mere exposure effect in which other 
judgments were misattributed.  In other words, judgments of brightness and darkness 
were not attributed to the actual source—perceptual fluency. 
The Sleeper Effect 
 Perhaps no fluency effect has been more controversial than the sleeper effect 
(e.g., Pratkanis, Greenwald, Leippe, & Baumgardner, 1988).  In the sleeper effect, 
persuasive messages from a low-reliable source do not initially change attitudes; 
however, after a delay, those messages are much more effective and do change attitudes 
(Hovland, Lumsdaine, & Sheffield, 1949).  This effect is typically thought to reflect a 
process wherein participants remember the message but forget the source of that 
message.  In this way, the message is initially discounted because of its source but 
eventually endorsed once that source is forgotten. 
 Anecdotally, this effect seems straight-forward.  After all, it seems like a fairly 
common occurrence to remember having read some fact somewhere but not quite 
remember where that somewhere actually is.  In this way, there has been a dissociation 
over time between memory for the source of the material and memory for the message 
gained from that source. 
Jacoby, Kelley, Brown, and Jasechko (1989) took issue with the interpretation of 
the sleeper effect as being indicative that the source was forgotten though the message 
was not.  Instead, to explain these and similar findings, Jacoby and Kelley (1987) made 
the distinction between using memory as an object versus using memory as a tool—a 
distinction first made by Polyani (1958).  In conscious recall, memory is treated as an 
object that is to be inspected specifically for a memory that can then be described to 
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others.  However, this is not the only way that memory can be used.  Jacoby differentiates 
this use of memory and the use of memory as a tool.  When memory is used as a tool, it is 
used to unconsciously influence the perception and interpretation of a current event.  This 
distinction between memory as object versus memory as tool can be thought of as the 
difference between attention being placed in the past versus attention being focused in the 
present.  When memory is an object to be inspected, attention is in the past.  When 
memory is a tool, attention is in the present in order to solve some current problem. 
Jacoby and colleagues (1989) argued that using a message and consciously 
recalling its source are separate acts involving different focuses of attention and different 
retrieval orientations.  A failure to recall the source does not necessarily mean that the 
source has actually been forgotten; rather, it could be that there was not an attempt to 
recall the source when recalling the message.  Unless recollection of the source is really 
important, the more time that passes, the more difficult recall becomes and the more 
likely the source will simply be neglected.    
Fluency Effects and Advertising 
 Mere exposure and sleeper effects are just two of many different effects that can 
be attributed, at least in part, to an increase in fluency associated with implicit memory.  
Although these fluency effects have not been extensively used in advertising research, it 
is clear that they could be important outcomes of brand exposures.   
In a typical advertising paradigm, an individual is exposed to an advertisement for 
some product.  Although the ad is presumably intended to persuade the individual to buy 
the product being advertised, it can be assumed that most people tend to discount ads.  In 
other words, in much the same way as people discount political ads because they are 
       
 
47 
coming from partisan rather than independent sources, it is likely that the messages 
contained in product ads would also be discounted.  After all, it is unlikely that many 
people would consider Nike to be the unbiased source to turn to when looking for 
information about shoes. 
Using a mere exposure procedure, the increase in fluency attributed to brand 
exposure through ads should lead to an increase in positive affect.  However, if there is an 
initial awareness of where the fluency is derived from, that affect will probably be offset 
or eliminated.  Based on the work of Jacoby, though, it is possible that after some period 
of time, when thinking about the product or brand, a nonanalytic strategy using memory 
as a tool rather than an object will be adopted and the source of the fluency will not be 
considered.  Therefore, it is possible that a sleeper effect in advertising could be created 
wherein initial affect toward a brand would show no increase after ad exposure but, over 
time, the affect will increase as the fluency is dissociated with the ad and misattributed to 
generally positive feelings. 
As noted throughout, there has been very little research that has examined the 
effects of perceptual versus conceptual fluency and how that relates to any of these 
fluency effects.  In one of the few examples in which conceptual and perceptual fluency 
effects were tested together, advertisements received positive evaluations whether the ads 
were read or viewed in either a perceptual or a conceptual context (Lee & Labroo, 2004).  
In other words, conceptual and perceptual fluency operated similarly. 
Based on this research, the following hypothesis and research question is posed:   
H4: Participants exposed to advertisements will have more positive attitudes toward the 
advertised brands than those who were not exposed to the advertisements.   
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H5: Perceptual implicit memory performance will positively correlate with attitudes 
toward brands in the advertisements. 
H6: Conceptual implicit memory performance will positively correlate with attitudes 
toward brands in the advertisements. 
RQ: Will conceptual or perceptual fluency mediate the relationship between exposure to 
an advertisement and attitudes toward the brand in the ad?   
  
  
 
 
 
Chapter Six: Methodology 
 In order to test the hypotheses, a between-subjects with control groups experiment 
was run with a 2 (encoding) x 2 (attention) factorial design.  One factor, encoding, relates 
to the type of encoding participants engaged in based on specific instructional 
manipulations; the second factor, attention, relates to the cognitive load the participants 
were under.  The key dependent variables included conceptual and perceptual implicit 
memory, conceptual and perceptual explicit memory, and attitudes toward the brands.  
The dependent memory measures were run as between-subjects factors to ensure no 
cross-contamination.  This design allowed for a test of the TAP framework to be 
performed within the advertising context.  Furthermore, by having attitude measures, it 
could be determined whether perceptual or conceptual fluency correlated with an increase 
in positive attitudes.       
 Participants entered into a computer laboratory and first were exposed to various 
news websites and asked to assess their usability.  Some participants viewed the websites 
with full attention, whereas others had a secondary task to accomplish, which served to 
divide their attention.  After completing the website evaluations, participants took part in 
a distraction task that allowed them to rate website designs and layouts more generally.  
Participants then completed the memory measures associated with their condition, 
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followed by the attitude measures.  Finally, participants completed an awareness 
questionnaire. 
Participants 
 Two hundred forty-two participants were recruited from the research pool of the 
School of Journalism and Mass Communication at the University of North Carolina, 
Chapel Hill.  Participants from this pool participated in the experiment in exchange for 
course credit.  This sample was predominantly female (N = 198) with an average age of 
20.70 (SD = 3.02). 
An additional 133 participants were recruited from large, introductory 
communication courses at the S.I. Newhouse School of Public Communication at 
Syracuse University.  Participants from this pool participated in exchange for extra credit.  
This sample also skewed female (N = 82) with an average age of 18.95 (SD = .84).   
There were no significant differences between the two groups on any dependent 
variable.  Therefore, the groups were collapsed into one group for all hypothesis testing. 
Procedure 
 Participants entered a computer laboratory where they were randomly assigned to 
a computer pre-loaded with all test materials.  On each computer, a Word document was 
open that contained links for the participants to click on that related to the different 
components of this research (see Appendix A for a copy of the Word document).  After 
completing an informed consent, participants were told that they were participating in 
two research studies (see Appendix B for a complete script read by the facilitator).  The 
first research study was explained as an investigation in news website design and 
usability.  Participants would be looking at screenshots from the 21 top online news 
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websites in order to evaluate how each was designed.  Each screenshot would be 
followed by questions specific to that page.  Participants would then have the opportunity 
to design the layout of their own news website.   
After completing the website evaluations, participants were told that they would 
also be participating in a second research study the purpose of which was to determine 
what brands are most popular among undergraduates.  All of the instructions for both 
studies were contained within the Word document. 
Participants then looked in the Word document and clicked on the link labeled 
“Study One.”  This link took participants to an Internet website which opened with a 
repeat of the general instructions about evaluating top news websites.  Participants then 
evaluated 21 screenshots from different news websites.  This was done by having 
instructions that asked participants to quickly find and click on various components of the 
website, including the embedded advertisement.  A total of 15 target ads was embedded 
on the websites which were randomly rotated to control for order effects.  An additional 
six buffer ads were seen before and after the target ads to reduce any effects that could be 
attributed to primacy or recency.  Upon completion of the evaluations, the participants 
were instructed to close the web browser and return to the Word document. 
 Participants were next presented with a “website creation” task meant to mask the 
purpose of this study (see Appendix C for the distraction task materials).  In this task, 
participants viewed generic versions of different website layouts and were asked to rate 
them on a number of different dimensions.  This was followed by the participants 
creating a template for a news website that they believed would be easy to navigate. 
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 Once the short “website creation” task was completed, participants continued in 
the Word document, where they clicked on a link labeled “Study Two.”  This link 
directed them to a new website that was visually dissimilar to the first one.  There, they 
completed the memory measures in accordance with the condition in which they were 
assigned.  Once all of the memory measures were completed, participants were given the 
attitude measures relating to the previously encountered brands. 
 Finally, an awareness questionnaire was administered to the participants in the 
implicit memory conditions.  This assessed whether the participants noticed any 
connections between the study episode (advertisement rating) and the memory measures.   
 In addition to the sixteen experimental conditions, three control groups existed.  
The first was the attitude control group, which only completed the attitude assessments 
measures.  The second was a control group who first completed the conceptual implicit 
measure and then the attitude measure.  The third group completed the perceptual implicit 
measure and then the attitude measure.  These three groups served as the baseline against 
which any effects were compared. 
Although a great deal of past implicit memory research has used a within-subjects 
design wherein two “lists” of study items are created, an “A” and “B” list with one list 
serving as the baseline prime for each individual, this was not the case here as a between-
subjects design with control was deemed more appropriate.  In order to create the two A 
and B lists, a total of 30 embedded advertisements would have needed to be created—15 
to use on each list.  However, in the development of the appropriate brands discussed 
below, including 30 advertisements would have been too difficult as these ads needed to 
look as if they were actually part of the web pages.  Therefore, rather than threaten the 
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validity of the experiment and risk tipping off too many people that the ads they were 
viewing were created for this project, it was decided that only one list would be created 
and the control group would serve as baseline. 
Stimulus Materials 
 Stimulus materials were created in two steps.  The first step was to create the 
advertisements that would be embedded on each news website.  These ads were created 
using 15 of the brands determined to be appropriate for priming based on the pilot testing 
(see below).  In addition, another six ads were created to act as fillers. 
Once each ad was created, screenshots from the top news websites were created 
and the ads inserted.  In order to do this, screen shots were taken of actual websites (e.g., 
usatoday.com) and imported into Photoshop.  All website screen captures were taken on 
the same day so that the news items were similar across all websites.  In Photoshop, all 
actual advertisements were removed from the websites.  One of the created ads was then 
placed on the page and filler items inserted to take up any dead space left behind from the 
removal of the actual advertisements.  The edited screenshot was then exported as a new 
image that appeared very similar to the actual website, only now it had one of the ads 
relevant to this study.  Sample stimulus materials can be found in Appendix D. 
Pilot Test to Determine Appropriate Brands 
 Before the main study was performed, it was first necessary to conduct a pilot test 
in order to determine appropriate brands to be used.  The main reason for this is that if 
brands are used that have too high of a generation rate to begin with, then it would be 
impossible to show any sort of priming effect.  In other words, if participants generate 
Nike as the first brand that comes to mind 95% of the time in the baseline condition, then 
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priming effects would be nearly impossible to establish because the maximum increase 
possible would be 5% (from 95 to 100), which would be unlikely to be statistically 
significant with the number of participants used in this research.  This is why it was 
necessary to determine an approximate baseline condition for different brands in 
categories. 
In order to determine these baseline conditions, 30 participants from the same 
University of North Carolina research pool as the main studies participated in a brand 
norming study.  Participants were given 30 seconds to write down as many brand names 
(e.g., Nike) as they could for each of 61 product categories (e.g., shoes).  Responses were 
then analyzed to see, per category, which brands appeared most often among the first, 
second, and third brands listed by the participants 
Based on these data, 43 brands were chosen that were all well-known to the 
participants.  Each brand was produced first when prompted between 7 and 45% of the 
time.   
Pilot Test to Determine Word Fragments 
 Perceptual implicit measures have to be pilot tested in order to ensure that they, 
too, are not too easy or difficult to be completed.  In order to establish this, word 
fragments were created for 85 different brands, including all 43 of the brands from the 
first pilot test.  Another 30 participants from the same research pool were given 30 
seconds to solve each word fragment.  If the fragment was not solved in 30 seconds, the 
computer would automatically advance the participants to the next fragment.  If the 
participants were successful in solving the fragment, they continued on to the next word 
as soon as the fragment was completed.  Based on this pilot test, 15 brand names were 
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chosen that were previously determined in the first pilot to be acceptable and additionally 
whose word fragments were not too easily solved (see Appendix E for the list of brand 
names to be used). 
Independent Variables 
 The key manipulations for this experiment related to the cognitive processing at 
encoding and attention.  Both manipulations occurred between-subjects. 
Cognitive Processing at Encoding 
 Cognitive processing was manipulated through specific instructions given to the 
participants prior to viewing each ad.  In order to induce conceptual encoding of the 
advertisement, participants were told before viewing the ad that they were going to rate 
how familiar they were with the brand in the ad.  After viewing the ad, participants then 
answered a familiarity question on a 7-point semantic differential scale (familiar-
unfamiliar).  This caused the participants to encode the information conceptually as it 
focused their cognitive processing on thinking about the brand and how familiar they are 
with it.  Presumably, this type of processing is meaning-based. 
 In order to induce perceptual encoding, participants were told before viewing the 
advertisement to focus on how readable the brand name was in the ad.  After viewing the 
ad, the participants indicated how readable they thought the ad was on a 7-point semantic 
differential (readable-unreadable).  This caused participants to encode the information 
perceptually as it focused their attention on structural characteristics of the advertisement 
and brand name. 
Attention at Encoding 
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Attention was manipulated so that the ads were encoded under full or divided 
attention.  For the participants who encoded the stimuli at full attention, there was no 
specific mention of attention as they did not perform any secondary tasks.  For those who 
encoded the materials under divided attention, a secondary task was given to the 
participants to complete at the same time as they were exposed to the stimuli.  Past 
research (Mulligan & Stone, 1999) has shown that a moderately strong division of 
attention occurs when participants have to remember a 5 digit string of numbers.  
Participants therefore were told that prior to seeing each question about the website, they 
would be presented with a 5 digit number string (e.g., 78023).  When they saw the 5 digit 
display, they were to memorize it and then recall it after answering the questions about 
the website.   
Dependent Variables 
 There are five key dependent variables: conceptual implicit and explicit memory, 
perceptual implicit and explicit memory, and attitudes toward the brands presented in the 
ads.  Because the presentation of any one of the memory measures before another would 
present a confound, they were run as between-subjects variables with the attitude 
measure following the memory measures.  Additionally, there were control groups for the 
implicit memory measures as well as the attitude measures.  A discussion of how the 
memory measures were calculated follows the description of each of the memory 
measures. 
Conceptual Implicit Memory 
To gauge performance on a conceptual implicit memory test, a category exemplar 
production task was used.  Participants were told that they were going to be shown 60 
       
 
57 
product categories (e.g., batteries) and that they were to produce the first brand name that 
came to mind (e.g., Duracell).  It was stressed that they needed to answer the questions as 
quickly as possible as each category would only be present for a short time.  Importantly, 
the first 20 product categories used were not related to any of the brands previously seen.  
This should have helped participants get acclimated to the procedure without having any 
of the brands come to mind from the earlier part of the study.  The order of presentation 
of the 15 target categories was rotated to prevent any order effects.  The percentage of 
previously encountered brands generated served as the outcome variable (see Tables 1 
and 2 for descriptive statistics related to conceptual implicit memory). 
Conceptual Explicit Memory 
To gauge performance on a conceptual explicit memory test, a category-cued 
recall task was used.  Participants were given a list of product categories that 
corresponded to the brands previously encountered in the advertisement rating task.  
They were then informed that each product category related to one brand name 
previously encountered and to recall as many of those as possible.  The percentage of 
correct responses served as the outcome variable (see Table 3 for descriptive statistics 
related to conceptual explicit memory). 
Perceptual Implicit Memory 
To gauge performance on a perceptual implicit memory test, a word fragment 
completion task was performed.  In this procedure, 60 brand names were presented as 
word fragments (e.g., “O_b_t”) that the participants had to complete (“Orbit”).  These 
sixty brands corresponded to the 60 categories in the category exemplar production task.  
Fifteen of the word fragments corresponded to the previously encountered 
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advertisements.  The participants were told to complete the fragment as quickly as 
possible.  The percentage completed with the previously seen brand served as the 
outcome measure (see Tables 4 and 5 for descriptive statistics related to perceptual 
implicit memory). 
Perceptual Explicit Memory 
To gauge performance on a perceptual explicit memory test, a cued word 
fragment completion task was performed.  In this procedure, the 15 target brand names 
that were presented during encoding were presented as word fragments with instructions 
indicating that the fragments could be completed by words that were encountered earlier.  
The percentage correct served as the outcome measure (see Table 6 for descriptive 
statistics related to perceptual explicit memory). 
Calculating Memory Measures 
Consistent with past memory research (e.g., Mulligan, 1999), memory 
performance for each type of memory measure was calculated by collapsing each 
participant’s responses to form one overall memory variable.  In the conceptual implicit 
memory condition, each participant’s responses to the fifteen generation cues were coded 
as either matching the previously seen brand (=1) or not matching the previous brand 
(=0).  In the perceptual implicit memory conditions, each participant’s word fragment 
completion was coded as either completing the word fragment that matched the 
previously encountered brand (=1) or not completing the word fragment with a brand that 
matched the previously encountered brand (=0).  The responses across the fifteen 
generations or word fragment completions were then collapsed to create a mean overall 
response.  In other words, if the participant had correctly generated 5 of the 15 brands, 
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meaning that he or she had correctly matched 33% of the responses, his or her average 
conceptual memory mean score would be .33.  A similar process was used for the explicit 
memory conditions, with the percent correctly recalled serving as the outcome measure 
for the conceptual explicit memory measure and the percent of word fragments correctly 
completed serving as the outcome measure for the perceptual explicit measure.   
Attitude Toward Brands 
For the attitude assessment measure, participants were given a list of 15 brand 
names.  They then had to rate on a 7-point semantic differential scale their attitudes 
toward the brand on four dimensions: like-dislike, good-bad, positive-negative, and 
favorable-unfavorable.  Past research has suggested these four dimensions are valid 
measures of attitudes toward brands (MacKenzie, Lutz & Belch, 1986). 
The four items that related to each participant’s overall attitude toward each brand 
were averaged to create a mean attitude toward the brand.  Each individual attitude 
measure was reliable (all alphas above .90).  The means of all 15 attitudes toward the 
brands were then averaged across all brands to create a single, overall mean attitude 
variable toward all the brands in the experiment.  Complete descriptive statistics for each 
item, along with scale reliability numbers, can be found in Tables 7-9.  
Awareness Questionnaire 
 After completing the implicit memory measures, participants were given an 
awareness questionnaire.  In this questionnaire, five questions were asked that looked to 
identify participants who may have “caught on” to the purpose of the experiment.  The 
five questions got increasingly specific and should have found any participants who were 
test aware.  This is an important task as past research (Mace, 2003)  has shown that those 
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who are test aware tend to use explicit recall strategies and show more priming than those 
who are test unaware.  In other words, including test aware participants inflates priming 
results.  The questionnaire can be found in Appendix F. 
The responses from the 5-item awareness questionnaire were coded to determine 
if participants were ever aware of the connection between the implicit memory measures 
and the study phase.  Those participants who indicated that they were unaware of any 
connections, as well as those who indicated that they were aware of a connection but only 
became aware of the connection after the awareness questionnaire began, were put into 
the test unaware group (=0).  All others were put into the test aware group (=1).   
  
  
 
 
 
Chapter Seven: Results 
 The results chapter is broken into the following sections, which are based upon 
the different dependent variables: conceptual implicit memory, perceptual implicit 
memory, conceptual explicit memory, perceptual explicit memory, and attitudes.  A one-
way ANOVA comparing conceptual encoding, perceptual encoding, and a control 
baseline condition on the conceptual memory measure was first used in order to 
determine whether any overall priming effects occurred such that those who were 
exposed to the advertisements during the webpage evaluation task produced the brands 
from those ads significantly more often than those who had not been exposed to the ad, 
which would be expected.  A similar one-way ANOVA was used with the perceptual 
implicit memory measure, again with the expectation being that those who were exposed 
to the advertisements would complete the word-fragments with the brand names 
significantly more often than the baseline condition.   
These analyses were followed with a 2 (encoding) X 2 (attention) ANOVA for 
both the conceptual and perceptual implicit memory measures.  This test was used to 
determine: a) whether there were significant differences on memory measures based on 
how the advertisement was encoded, b) whether the participants’ attention was full or 
divided, and c) whether there was an interaction between the two.  According to the TAP 
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framework, it would be expected that memory performance would be enhanced when 
processing at encoding matches processing at recall.  In other words, for conceptual 
memory measures, those who encoded the information conceptually should have 
performed better than those who encoded the information perceptually.  For attention, it 
was unclear from past research whether dividing attention would significantly decrease 
all memory performance or just perceptually-based measures.   
Finally, for analyses related to attitudes, bivariate correlations were used to assess 
whether there were any significant correlations between each type of memory 
performance and attitudes.  Based on prior research, it is expected that perceptual 
fluency, as indicated by perceptual implicit memory measures, should positively correlate 
with attitudes.  A similar result is predicted for conceptual fluency.  Mediation and 
moderation analysis were also used to determine whether memory performance mediated 
or moderated the relationship between ad exposure and attitudes. 
Conceptual Implicit Memory 
 The first hypothesis related to conceptual implicit memory (H1A) and proposed 
that the participants who encoded an advertisement conceptually would demonstrate 
increased performance on an implicit conceptual memory measure compared to those 
who encoded the advertisement perceptually as well as compared to a control group.  In 
order to test this, an ANOVA was conducted wherein each encoding condition was 
treated as a group and contrasted with the control group, thereby creating three groups: 
conceptual encoding, perceptual encoding, and the control group.  Awareness (test aware, 
test unaware) was also entered into the ANOVA to determine whether that affected 
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conceptual implicit memory performance, creating a 3 (conceptual encoding, perceptual 
encoding, control) x 2 (test aware, test unaware) analysis.   
 There was a significant main effect for both the type of encoding (F (2, 110) = 
14.27, p < .001) and awareness (F (1, 110) = 6.79, p < .01 ), although not an interaction 
between the two (F < 1).  According to Fisher’s Least Significant Difference post hoc 
comparisons, both the conceptual encoding condition (M = .38, SD = .14) and the 
perceptual encoding conditions (M = .30, SD = .13) were significantly higher than the 
control condition (M = .18, SD = .10).  Furthermore, the conceptual encoding condition 
was significantly higher than the perceptual encoding condition.  These results are 
exactly as predicted.  Looking at the means of the aware versus unaware groups, the 
aware group (M = .40, SD = .13) performed significantly better than the test unaware 
group (M = .29, SD = .15).  Those who were aware, then, performed better than those 
who were unaware, suggesting that they were using explicit retrieval strategies to 
enhance their performance.  In order to extinguish this inflation of results, all subsequent 
analyses performed with conceptual implicit memory measures only used those who were 
determined to be test unaware. 
 Accordingly, an ANOVA was again conducted, this time comparing the test 
unaware participants in the conceptual encoding, perceptual encoding, and control groups 
with how they each performed on the conceptual implicit memory measure.   
 A significant main effect of encoding occurred, F (2, 93) = 15.05, p < .001.  
According to Fisher’s Least Significant Difference post hoc comparisons, both the 
conceptual encoding condition (M = .36, SD = .15) and the perceptual encoding 
condition (M = .29, SD = .13) were significantly higher than the control condition (M = 
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.18, SD = .10).  Furthermore, the conceptual encoding condition was significantly higher 
than the perceptual encoding condition.  Hypothesis 1A is therefore fully supported. 
 The next set of hypotheses that relate to conceptual implicit memory (H3A and 
H3B) predict that dividing a participant’s attention will decrease performance on a 
conceptual implicit measure.  These hypotheses are derived from both the limited-
capacity as well as the TAP frameworks.  In order to test this, a 2 (encoding: conceptual 
or perceptual) X 2 (attention: full or divided) ANOVA was conducted.   
There was a significant main effect for both encoding (F (1, 52) = 11.69, p < .01) 
and attention (F (1, 52) = 5.32, p < .05), although not the interaction between the two (F 
< 1).  Results indicate that those in the conceptual encoding condition (M = .36, SD = 
.12) performed better than those in the perceptual encoding condition (M = .27, SD = 
.12), which confirms the previous one-way ANOVA already performed.  Results also 
indicate that those with full attention (M = .33, SD = .13) performed better than those 
with divided attention (M = .28, SD = .12).  Hypotheses 3A and 3B are therefore 
supported for conceptual implicit memory as those in the divided attention conditions 
performed significantly worse than those who encoded with their full attention. 
 In summary, results related to conceptual implicit memory measures suggest that 
significant priming occurred in both encoding conditions, such that regardless of how one 
encoded the information, performance on the conceptual implicit memory measure was 
above the baseline control group.  Furthermore, how the information was encoded 
mattered, as those who encoded the information conceptually outperformed the 
perceptual encoding group.  This finding is consistent with the TAP framework, as 
matching encoding and testing processes generally enhanced performance.  Finally, 
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dividing attention appeared to have negatively affected memory performance, consistent 
with both TAP and limited-capacity frameworks.     
Perceptual Implicit Memory 
 The first hypothesis related to perceptual implicit memory (H2A) argued that 
participants who encoded an advertisement perceptually would demonstrate increased 
performance on perceptual implicit memory measures compared to those who encoded 
the advertisement conceptually or compared to a control group.  In order to explore this, a 
similar 3 (conceptual encoding, perceptual encoding, control) x 2 (test aware, test 
unaware) ANOVA was conducted comparing performance on the perceptual implicit 
memory measure.   
 There was a significant main effect for both the condition (F (2, 114) = 4.80, p < 
.01) and awareness (F (1, 114) = 1.79, p < .01 ), although not the interaction between the 
two (F < 1).  According to Fisher’s Least Significant Difference post hoc comparisons, 
both the conceptual encoding condition (M = .28, SD = .15) and the perceptual encoding 
condition (M = .28, SD = .12) were significantly higher than the control condition (M = 
.17, SD = .11) for the perceptual implicit memory measure.  However, the conceptual 
encoding condition was not significantly different from the perceptual encoding 
condition.  Looking at the means of the aware versus unaware groups, the aware group 
(M = .35, SD = .14) performed significantly better than the test unaware group (M = .23, 
SD = .12).  As with the conceptual memory measure, these results suggest that aware 
participants were using explicit retrieval strategies to enhance their performance.  In 
order to extinguish this inflation of the results, all subsequent analyses performed with 
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perceptual implicit memory measures used only those who were determined to be test 
unaware. 
Accordingly, an ANOVA was again conducted, this time comparing the unaware 
participants in the conceptual encoding, perceptual encoding, and control groups on how 
they each performed on the perceptual implicit memory measure.  There was a significant 
main effect for condition, F (2, 87) = 4.65, p < .01.  According to Fisher’s Least 
Significant Difference post hoc comparisons, both the conceptual encoding condition (M 
= .25, SD = .15) and the perceptual encoding condition (M = .27, SD = .10) were 
significantly higher than the control condition (M = .17, SD = .11) for the perceptual 
implicit memory measure.  However, the conceptual and perceptual encoding conditions 
did not differ from each other.  Hypothesis 1B, then, is partially supported. 
 For perceptual implicit memory, Hypotheses 3A and 3B were competing, with the 
limited-capacity framework predicting significantly worse performance when attention 
was divided whereas the TAP framework predicted no differences should emerge.  To 
test these hypotheses, a 2 (encoding) x 2 (attention) ANOVA was conducted.  Results 
suggest that there were no main effects for either encoding (F < 1) or attention, F (1, 58) 
= 1.33, p > .05.  These results do not support Hypothesis 3A, which argued that dividing 
attention would negatively affect memory performance.  The results support Hypothesis 
3B, though, which stated that dividing attention would cause no negative effects for 
perceptual memory measures.  
 In summary, results related to perceptual implicit memory measures suggest that 
significant priming occurred in both encoding conditions, such that regardless of how one 
encoded the information, performance on the perceptual implicit memory measure was 
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above the baseline control group.  However, unlike with the conceptual implicit memory 
measure and counter to the TAP framework, there were no differences between the two 
encoding conditions on perceptual implicit memory performance.  It was predicted that 
those who encoded the information perceptually would outperform those who encoded 
the information conceptually on a perceptual implicit memory measure.  Furthermore, no 
differences were found relating to attention.  This runs contrary to the limited capacity 
framework, which predicted that dividing attention would negatively affect any memory 
measure regardless of encoding condition, and supports the TAP framework, which 
predicted that dividing attention would not negatively affect perceptually driven 
measures. 
Conceptual Explicit Memory 
 The first hypothesis related to conceptual explicit memory (H1B) argued that 
there would be increased performance on an explicit conceptual memory measure for 
those who encoded the information conceptually compared to those who encoded it 
perceptually.  The other set of hypotheses related to explicit memory (H3A and H3B) 
were those that, as with conceptual implicit memory, argued that dividing attention at 
encoding would negatively impact recall on conceptually driven measures. 
In order to test these hypotheses, a 2 (encoding: conceptual or perceptual) X 2 
(attention: full or divided) ANOVA was run.  There was a significant main effect for 
encoding, F (1, 49) = 6.07, p < .05, with those who encoded the information conceptually 
(M = .81, SD = .15) having performed better than those who encoded the information 
perceptually (M = .67, SD = .19).  Hypothesis 1B is therefore supported and the results 
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support the TAP framework generally as it predicted that memory performance would 
increase when the encoding and test processes matched.   
There was not a significant main effect for attention, F (1, 49) = 1.30, p > .05.  
Hypotheses 3A and 3B are therefore rejected, since dividing attention did not have a 
negative impact on conceptual explicit memory performance.  These results are not 
consistent with either the limited-capacity or the TAP frameworks and are highly 
unusual.  In order to further analyze the data to try to determine why there was not an 
effect when most past research suggests there should be one, another 2 (encoding) x 2 
(attention) ANOVA was conducted comparing performance on the conceptual implicit 
memory measure—this time using only those who were test aware.  In this way, the 
participants were presumably using explicit retrieval strategies—in many ways turning 
the implicit test into an explicit one.  Results from this analysis indicate that there was not 
a main effect for attention, F (1, 28) = 2.36, p > .05.  Again, this is highly unusual, as 
both the limited-capacity and the TAP frameworks would have predicted that a division 
of attention would have negatively impacted performance on conceptually-driven 
measures.  A more thorough discussion of these incongruous results will take place in the 
following chapter. 
Perceptual Explicit Memory 
 The first hypothesis related to perceptual explicit memory (H2B) argued that there 
would be an increase in performance on an explicit perceptual memory measure for those 
who encoded the information perceptually compared to those who encoded it 
conceptually.  The other set of hypotheses related to perceptual explicit memory (H3A 
and H3B) were those that, as with perceptual implicit memory, argued that dividing 
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attention at encoding would either negatively impact later memory performance (limited-
capacity framework) or would have no effect on performance (TAP framework). 
In order to test this, a 2 (encoding: conceptual or perceptual) X 2 (attention: full or 
divided) ANOVA was run.  There was not a significant main effect for encoding (F < 1).  
These results suggest that regardless of how the information was encoded, performance 
was similar on perceptual explicit memory measures.  This does not support the TAP 
framework, although the results do mirror those found with perceptual implicit memory. 
There was also no main effect for attention, F < 1.  Therefore, dividing attention 
at encoding did not cause there to be any lack of performance on the perceptual explicit 
memory measure.  These results do not support Hypothesis 3A, which suggested that 
dividing attention should hurt memory performance.  However, these results support 
Hypothesis 3B, which predicted performance would not suffer when attention was 
divided.   
Fluency and Attitudes Toward Brands 
 The first hypothesis related to attitudes toward the brands in the advertisements 
(H4) stated that those who were exposed to the advertisements would possess more 
positive attitudes toward the brands in the ads than those who were not exposed to the 
advertisements.  In order to test this, an ANOVA was conducted comparing three groups: 
a) the true attitude control group who only answered the attitude questions, b) the other 
attitude control groups who performed the implicit memory measures (conceptual or 
perceptual) before completing the attitude questions, and c) the experimental groups.  
Results indicate a significant main effect, F (2, 127) = 3.35, p < .05.  According to 
Fisher’s Least Significant Difference post hoc comparisons, the experimental group had 
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significantly more positive attitudes (M = 4.94, SD = .57) than the true control group (M 
= 4.65, SD = .51).  The group who completed the implicit measures first did not differ 
significantly from either group (M = 4.87, SD = .47).  This hypothesis was, therefore, 
partially supported, as those who were exposed to the advertisements experimentally did 
have higher evaluations of the brands than a control group who did not see the 
advertisements; however, they did not significantly differ from the group who only 
completed the implicit memory measures prior to the attitude questions. 
 The next set of hypotheses (H5 and H6) predicted that perceptual and conceptual 
fluency would each correlate positively with attitudes toward the brands in the study.  To 
test this, a bivariate correlation was conducted between memory performance (conceptual 
or perceptual) and attitudes.  Because awareness has proven to be an important 
consideration, all analyses were conducted separately on the test aware and test unaware 
groups. 
 Considering first perceptual fluency, regardless of whether the participants were 
test unaware, test aware, or in the control group, none demonstrated any correlations 
between implicit memory performance and attitudes (rs of .11, .35, and .38 respectively, 
p > .05).  These results suggest that unlike the mere exposure effect, which is traditionally 
thought to be driven by perceptual fluency, when making brand evaluations, perceptual 
fluency does not seem to have a relationship with attitudes.  H5 is therefore not 
supported. 
Considering conceptual fluency next, those who were test unaware demonstrated 
a moderately strong correlation between implicit memory performance and attitudes, r = 
.59, p < .001.  In contrast, those who were test aware did not show any relationship 
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between memory performance and attitudes, r = .05, p > .05.  Similarly, those who were 
in the conceptual implicit memory control group who also completed the attitude 
measures demonstrated no correlation between memory performance and attitudes, r = 
.07, p > .05.  These results, which support H6, would suggest that conceptual fluency did 
correlate overall with attitudes but only if participants were unaware of the connection 
between the memory and attitude measures and the previous exposure to the 
advertisements.  This important difference could suggest that an effect similar to a sleeper 
effect may have occurred wherein those who were aware of the source of their positive 
feelings were able to discount those feelings—a topic that will be returned to in the next 
chapter.   
 Using Fisher’s Z to compare the correlations between conceptual and perceptual 
fluency and attitudes, results suggest that the correlations are significantly different from 
each other such that the conceptual fluency correlation is significantly stronger than the 
perceptual fluency correlation, z = 3.17, p < .01. 
 Finally, although no specific hypotheses were created for explicit measures, 
correlations were conducted between explicit memory performance and attitudes.  First, 
for explicit memory performance on the conceptually driven recall test, there was no 
relationship between memory and attitudes, r  = .03, p > .05.  Next, for explicit memory 
performance on the perceptually driven word fragment completion test, there was no 
relationship between memory performance and attitudes, r = .06, p > .05.  These results 
suggest that performance on explicit measures of memory do not have any relationship 
with subsequent attitude evaluations. 
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 In summary, results would suggest that of the four memory measures, only 
conceptual implicit memory performance significantly correlated with attitudes.  The 
research question explored whether implicit memory performance mediates the 
relationship between ad exposure and attitudes toward the brands in the ads.  Because 
conceptual fluency among test unaware participants was the only condition that 
significantly correlated with attitudes, mediation and moderation analysis will only be 
performed with that condition.   
Mediation analysis is warranted because conceptual implicit memory performance 
may lie in the causal sequence between ad exposure and attitudes toward the brands in 
the ads.  Figure 1 depicts the predicted relationships.  As can be seen, path a represents 
the effect of ad exposure on conceptual implicit memory performance, path b represents 
the effect of conceptual implicit memory performance on attitudes toward brands from 
the advertisements, path c represents the direct effect of exposure on attitudes, and path c’ 
represents the direct effect of exposure on attitudes adjusted for conceptual implicit 
memory performance.  The mediated effect would be the product of a and b. 
 Results suggest that the direct effect from advertisement exposure to attitude 
evaluations (c) was not significant, t (121) = .81, p > .05.  Although traditional mediation 
analysis (Baron & Kenny, 1986) would suggest that it is necessary to demonstrate a 
significant main effect before any indirect effects can be discussed, recent discussions 
have been highly critical of this approach (see, for example, Zhao, Lynch, & Chen, 
2010).  Therefore, further analysis will be performed using SPSS syntax developed by 
Preacher and Hayes (2008) that will give not only all path coefficients, but also 
       
 
73 
bootstrapped confidence intervals for the indirect path as suggested by Zhao and 
colleagues. 
 The coefficient between ad exposure and conceptual implicit memory 
performance (b = .16) was significant, t (121) = 7.28, p < .05, which confirms previous 
results that suggested significant priming for those who were exposed to the 
advertisements.  Confirming the correlation analysis is the significant path (b = 2.24) 
between conceptual implicit memory performance and attitudes toward the brands, t 
(121) = 5.86, p < .05.  Returning to the direct effect of exposure on attitudes with 
memory performance taken into account (c’), the path (b = -.28) is now significant and 
negative, t (121) = -2.49, p < .05, which suggests a suppression effect may have been 
occurring that inhibited the direct effect from appearing significant. 
 Turning now to the indirect effect, the result of the Sobel test suggests that the 
mediating effect of conceptual implicit memory performance on brand attitudes was 
significant (z = 4.54, p < .05).  Furthermore, bootstrap results for the indirect effect using 
10,000 bootstrap resamples shows an indirect effect within a 95% confidence interval 
falling between .21 and .52, affirming the significant indirect relationship. 
 Although these results suggest that implicit memory may mediate the relationship 
between exposure and attitudes, conceptually it perhaps makes more sense for there to be 
a moderating relationship.  In fact, it could be argued that exposure works as the 
moderator for memory – that is, memory may always have some sort of relationship with 
attitudes, but exposure or lack thereof may heighten or dampen that relationship. 
 In order to test for this moderating relationship, a hierarchical regression was 
performed with implicit memory performance as well as exposure (0=no exposure, 
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1=exposure) being entered in Step 1.  The two-way interaction between exposure and 
memory performance was entered into Step 2.  A significant two-way interaction would 
indicate the possibility of a moderating relationship. 
 According to the results of Step 1 (see Table 10), both exposure (B = -.42, SE B = 
.15, p < .01) and implicit memory performance (B = 2.20, SE B = .56, p < .001) predicted 
overall attitude performance, R2 = .27, F (2, 46) = 8.56, p < .01.  The addition of the two-
way interaction (B =  2.75, SE B = 1.18, p < .05) in Step 2 yielded a significant 
improvement, ∆R2 = .08, ∆F(1,45) = 5.45, p < .05. 
 Next, simple slope analyses were performed to examine the significant memory X 
exposure interaction (see Figure 2).  Simple slope analysis was conducted to isolate the 
contribution of exposure in overall attitudes, depending on the level of implicit memory 
performance.  As the figure shows, the slope is larger for the “ad exposure” condition (B 
= 2.98) than the “no ad exposure” condition (B = .23).   
 According to subsequent one-tailed t-tests (see Aiken & West, 1991, p. 17), the ad 
exposure slope was significantly different from zero (t (45) = 2.86, p < .05), whereas the 
no exposure slope was not (t (45) = 1.72, p > .05).  These results suggest that exposure to 
the ad does indeed act as a moderator enhancing the effects of implicit conceptual 
fluency. 
 Returning to the research question, it would appear that ad exposure moderates 
the relationship between conceptual fluency and brand attitudes.  It is likely that this 
effect only holds for those who are unaware of the connection between their positive 
attitudes toward the brands and the previous ad exposure.  These results suggest that the 
type of memory accessibility matters when interested in attitudes—in other words, 
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merely having a brand be accessible is not the same as having that information accessible 
in a conceptual manner. 
  
  
 
 
 
Chapter Eight: Discussion 
 Every day, consumers are bombarded with commercial messages and 
advertisements.  Although these messages can come from a variety of sources—ranging 
from the sides of buses to inserts in newspapers—one popular method of gaining brand 
recognition is to use advertisements embedded within websites.  Past research, using 
explicit recall as the most common dependent variable, has suggested that memory for 
those ads is low.  However, almost no past research in the advertising context has explore 
implicit memory—and those that have used implicit memory measures have done so 
without a theoretical framework or a recognition that there are different types of implicit 
memory measures. 
The purpose of this research was to demonstrate the usefulness and 
appropriateness of implicit memory measures for communication and advertising 
research.  Although a significant body of research in communication has used priming as 
the methodology (for a review, see Roskos-Ewoldsen, Roskos-Ewoldsen, & Dillman 
Carpentier, 2008), few have specifically used priming with an implicit memory 
framework.  Throughout the following discussion, the argument will be made that 
implicit memory measures need to be embraced as an alternative, indirect method to 
gauge the effectiveness of mediated messages.  This discussion will begin by discussing 
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and contextualizing the results as they relate to the TAP framework and implicit memory 
generally, followed by relating the results to encoding, attention and attitudes.  Finally, 
this chapter will conclude with a discussion of some of the limitations of this study as 
well as a description of future research. 
Implicit Memory Measures 
 One of the primary purposes of this dissertation was to demonstrate that by 
exposing participants to embedded advertisements placed on news websites, there would 
be significant priming such that those who encoded the advertisements would have those 
brands more accessible in their memories, which would translate to those brands being 
mentioned first more often (conceptual implicit measure) or used more often to complete 
word fragments (perceptual implicit measure) when compared to a control group.  This is 
exactly what was found: regardless of whether the implicit memory measure was 
conceptual or perceptual in nature, significant priming occurred. 
 It is important to take note that significant priming occurred in both the perceptual 
and conceptual memory conditions.  To date, the vast majority of research in the 
communication field has only used perceptual implicit memory measures and few have 
attempted to use conceptual measures.  This research, using both types of measures, 
suggests that exposure to the same advertisement can cause both conceptual and 
perceptual priming to occur.   
 Within the TAP framework, distinctions are made between conceptual and 
perceptual memory measures.  Although it is important to recognize that priming 
occurred in this current endeavor in both types of memory measures, it is also important 
to think theoretically about what the different types of measures mean and which could 
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ultimately prove to be more useful in future communication research.  In other words, it 
is important to move beyond merely making the distinction between an explicit/direct 
measure and an implicit/indirect measure and recognize the important differences 
between measures based on how the information is being processed at recall.  
 Speculatively, it could be argued that conceptual implicit memory measures are 
more important and have higher face validity than perceptual measures, especially in the 
realm of advertising research.  After all, a perceptual measure tends to test one’s ability to 
distinguish structural or surface features; it is difficult to make a strong argument as to 
why that might be important in advertising research or everyday decision making.  There 
are not many times when having that type of memory fluency available would seem to 
really make a difference. 
 On the other hand, it is easy to make the argument that conceptual implicit 
memory measures are good to use.  They measure how accessible items are in memory in 
a more meaning-based manner than perceptual measures.  In fact, in this research, the 
measure was specifically gauging how frequently the primed brands became the first to 
come to mind.  If advertisers are trying to make an impact with their campaigns, being 
able to have a brand become the first that comes to mind would clearly be an important 
outcome.  In these ways, conceptual implicit memory measures would seem to be more 
valid than perceptual measures. 
 It is important to note that conceptual implicit memory measures could have more 
face validity because the majority of communication and advertising research using 
implicit memory measures has tended to use perceptually driven measures.  Furthermore, 
based on the results of this study in regards to attitudes (discussed below), it would 
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appear that it is conceptual and not perceptual fluency that may have a relationship with 
attitudes toward known brands.  This further adds to the argument that when fluency is 
going to be assessed within a research study, it should be assessed in a conceptual 
manner. 
Awareness and Implicit Memory 
 Absent from past communication research using implicit memory measures is the 
use of any sort of awareness questionnaire.  Past research in the field of psychology has 
demonstrated that awareness questionnaires are valid instruments that are, if anything, 
conservative in nature in making the distinction between those who are test aware and 
those who are unaware (Mace, 2003).  This distinction is particularly crucial, as evidence 
suggests that those who are test aware tend to use explicit memory to aid in their taking 
of the implicit measures, with the net effect being an increase in apparent “implicit” 
memory performance. 
 The importance of understanding awareness is made clear if we return to Jacoby 
and Kelley’s (1987) conceptualization of memory, which maintained that memory can be 
used as an object or as a tool.  When used as a tool, focus and attention are on the task at 
hand and memory works to unconsciously influence behavior.  When used as an object, 
focus and attention are on memory itself as it is consciously searched in order to aid with 
the task at hand.  When used as a tool, one is typically unaware of the influence of 
memory; when used as an object, one is aware that memory is involved.   
Therefore, an indicator of how memory is being used can be demonstrated with 
the awareness questionnaire.  If a participant is aware of the connection between ad 
exposure and the memory measures, then it is likely that explicit memory is being used—
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that is, conscious retrieval strategies using memory as an object.  If a participant is 
unaware, then it is likely that only implicit memory is being used and memory is serving 
as a tool.  After all, returning to the earlier conceptualization of what “implicit” means in 
the context of memory measures, one of the four key components was a lack of 
awareness of the influence of memory, along with a lack of intentional use of memory, a 
lack of control in directing memory, and a high level of efficiency.  Respondents who 
were test aware were failing in those areas, as they were intentionally and in a controlled 
manner directing their attention back to prior memories in order to aid in their responses. 
 In this present research, it was demonstrated that for both perceptual and 
conceptual implicit memory measures, around half of all participants were test aware and 
made a connection between the study episode (looking at the ads) and the memory 
measures.   For those who were test aware, memory performance tended to be 
significantly higher than those who were test unaware.  This pattern of results is 
consistent with past research (Mace, 2003).  In this way, test aware participants were 
inflating the results such that more priming appeared to be occurring than actually was.  
Once those who were test aware were removed from analysis, priming decreased, 
although it was still significant.  Maintaining significant results after aware subjects are 
removed may not always occur, though, as it is feasible that with those participants 
removed, significant priming may not have occurred.    
It is important that future research within the communications field adopt some 
version of an awareness questionnaire.  The evidence presented here suggests that past 
communication research using implicit memory measures may be overinflated due to 
awareness and the alternative explanation that explicit contamination was driving 
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previous results cannot be ruled out.  Clearly, if implicit memory measures are going to 
be used in the future, awareness must be considered. 
Encoding Specificity 
 In addition to recognizing that memory measures can be conceptual or perceptual 
in nature, the TAP framework also stresses the importance of distinguishing between 
conceptual and perceptual encoding of stimulus materials.  Conceptual encoding occurs 
when the item is thought about during encoding in a meaningful manner, whereas 
perceptual encoding occurs when the item is thought about in terms of its surface 
features.  Thinking about how familiar a brand in an advertisement is would cause 
conceptual processing; thinking about how readable a brand name is in an advertisement 
would cause perceptual processing.   By thinking about a stimulus material in these 
different manners, different processing is argued to occur, resulting in different types of 
memory storage.  Results from this research support the TAP framework and point to the 
importance of considering the type of processing engaged in encoding, as it can 
significantly affect the outcome measures.   
The TAP framework was most evident in the conditions involving conceptual 
measures, whether those measures were explicit or implicit in nature.  The TAP 
framework predicts that individuals who encode information conceptually will 
outperform individuals who encode information perceptually when the memory measure 
is conceptual.  This is exactly what was found.  For both implicit and explicit conceptual 
memory measures, those who were given the instructions that encourage conceptual 
encoding performed significantly better than those who were given the perceptual 
instructions.   
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Results therefore confirm that there is a need for a “match” between processing at 
encoding and processing at recall for conceptual memory measures in the advertising 
context.  This is an important realization, as most research typically has used a memory 
measure such as recall (which is, of course, conceptually driven) without necessarily 
thinking about how the information was encoded.  It is clear from this research that how 
information is encoded, even while using such a simple manipulation as the one 
performed here, will affect the results of the research.  Accordingly, when designing 
messages that will be tested using memory variables, it is important to consider how the 
information will be encoded, as this may help contextualize and explain results. 
Upon initial inspection, it would appear that the TAP framework found less 
support for the perceptual measures.  For both the perceptual implicit and explicit tests, 
there were no differences in memory performance based upon how the information was 
encoded.  Although this may appear to contradict the basic tenets of the TAP framework, 
the results actually make sense when approached from an understanding of how 
information is processed and are consistent with other, similar frameworks, such as 
levels-of-processing (Craik & Lockhart, 1972). 
The very first stage of any information processing is a perceptual analysis.  That 
is, when any stimulus material is analyzed, it must first pass through a perceptual “store” 
so that it is possible to distinguish what we are actually looking at—from an evolutionary 
perspective, quickly distinguishing a dangerous lion from an innocuous gazelle.  It is 
likely, therefore, that whenever participants viewed the advertisement, they would have 
always encoded the information perceptually, regardless of what their specific directions 
were.  In other words, even if they were receiving instructions to think about how 
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familiar the brand name in the advertisement was, the first step would have been to 
quickly read the brand name and process it perceptually.  Only once that analysis was 
complete would they continue with the conceptual encoding. 
Furthermore, a review of the literature would suggest that differences between 
encoding conditions yield varying results, with many studies not finding any significant 
differences on perceptual implicit memory measures based upon encoding (e.g., Challis 
& Brodbeck, 1992; Roediger, Weldon, Stadler, & Riegler, 1992).  It is not entirely 
surprising, then, that there were no differences between conceptual and perceptual 
encoding for the perceptual memory measures.  In fact, it would have been more 
surprising had there been no differences for the conceptual measures; however, because 
the conceptual measures did show significant differences based upon encoding condition, 
the TAP framework did generally find support in this research.  As conceptual measures 
are probably the more appropriate measures to be used in advertising research, it is 
important to recognize how encoding can influence results. 
In many ways, these results replicate the research of Yang and Ewoldsen (2007) 
discussed earlier.  In their research, they used a conceptual explicit measure and a 
perceptual implicit measure and analyzed memory performance based upon whether the 
product seen in a movie was in the background, in the foreground, or part of the storyline.  
Speculatively, if the product was in the background or the foreground, it would have been 
encoded perceptually; however, if it was integrated into the storyline, it was probably 
encoded conceptually as attention was drawn to it and it was seen being used.  This is 
precisely what Yang and Ewoldsen’s results suggest, as participants were only able to 
recall those products that were integral to the storyline but had similar levels of 
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perceptual memory performance regardless of how the product was placed in the scene.  
In this way, even if the item was encoded conceptually, it was also encoded perceptually 
as indicated by the similar levels of implicit performance across conditions.   
Yang and Ewoldsen (2007) described their results as being driven by how 
“noticeable” the product was in the scene, but it is also possible that the differences were 
based on how the products were encoded.  Although this is just one alternative way to 
explain their results, by framing predictions and results within the TAP framework, a 
more theoretical account can be created that can then lead to further testing in future 
studies. 
Attention 
 Based upon previous research, dividing attention during the encoding process was 
believed to either cause poor later recall regardless of the memory measure because of the 
limited capacity to process information (Lang, 2000) or, based on the TAP framework, 
only affect recall when the test was conceptual in nature  (Morris, Bransford, & Franks, 
1977).  Of the four memory conditions (perceptual and conceptual implicit memory; 
perceptual and conceptual explicit memory), only in the conceptual implicit memory 
condition did a division of attention affect memory.   
The limited capacity framework, then, only found support within one of the four 
conditions and therefore did not hold up well within this present research.  In contrast, the 
TAP framework received significantly more support, as only the conceptual explicit 
memory condition did not fit within its predictions.  The three other conditions were all 
consistent with the TAP framework; however, it is highly unusual that a division of 
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attention would be effective on one conceptual measure (implicit) and not the other 
(explicit).  These results actually call into question the entire attention manipulation.   
In fact, there was not an effect of attention in the conceptual implicit memory 
condition for those who were test aware.  Approaching analysis from a different angle, it 
could be argued that three different conditions used conceptual measures: implicit 
unaware, implicit aware, and explicit.  Both theoretical frameworks would have predicted 
that attention would negatively impact performance on those memory measures; 
however, results suggest it only affected those who were unaware in the conceptual 
implicit memory group.  Two possible explanations will be mentioned here for these 
atypical results.  The first is that this is a unique and small effect that only shows up in 
the unaware conceptual implicit condition.  The second, and perhaps more likely, is that 
the significant findings are occurring because of Type I error. 
Considering the first explanation—that there was a really small effect of attention 
that only occurred with the conceptual implicit measure—these results still do not fit with 
most past research, as most research has suggested that small attention manipulations 
tend to affect explicit but not implicit measures (Mulligan & Stone, 1995).  This is not to 
say that there has been no past research that has found unique findings relating to 
divisions of attention.  Recent discussions in psychology have described what has been 
termed the attentional boost effect (Swallow & Jiang, 2010; Swallow & Jiang, 2011).  
Swallow and Jiang found that memory performance can actually be equal or better when 
performing a secondary task.  They argued that a transient increase in attention occurred 
when a secondary task was being performed at the same time as the primary task and that 
the increase in attention helps to encode the stimulus material.  Although their research 
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procedure is dissimilar from the current one, it is still possible that a similar effect is 
occurring here.  If future research is able to replicate these findings, then it possible that 
this anomaly is worth further thought.  For now, it seems more likely that the second 
explanation—Type I error—is what happened.   
A strong argument that this current manipulation of attention did not work is the 
large body of past research that has consistently demonstrated that this exact division of 
attention performed in this research causes dramatic differences for conceptually-based 
explicit memory measures (e.g., Mulligan, 1998).  One potentially important difference 
between this and much past research with divided attention is that the learning that 
occurred in the present research was unintentional—that is, the participants were unaware 
that there was going to be a later memory test.  Often, in divided attention paradigms, 
participants are informed that there is going to be a later memory test so that those in the 
full attention condition will have and use more cognitive resources to attempt to 
remember the study items compared to those in the divided attention conditions, who are 
allocating a great deal of resources to the secondary task.  In this experiment, those in the 
full attention condition may not have processed the advertisements more than those in the 
divided attention condition because they were not expecting to have to remember the 
information later. 
 Another plausible explanation for this lack of effect is that dividing attention task 
simply was not sufficient because the primary task involved specific instructions that the 
participants had to follow.  That is, the participants were told to think about the 
advertisement in a particular manner (conceptually or perceptually).  Presumably, the 
participants generally followed the directions and were able to perform the relatively 
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simple task of rating a brand’s familiarity or ease of reading, enough so that the 
information was encoded to the level required to get significant priming.  Having 
instructions did, in effect, override the attention manipulation. 
 In retrospect, the results as they relate to attention are not entirely surprising.  
Having the participants view the material in an unintentional learning design wherein 
they also have instructions directing them to encode the information in a very particular 
manner combined to reduce and extinguish any attention effects.  Although there did 
appear to be an effect for the conceptual implicit measure for those who were unaware, 
this result is likely a Type I error and not truly indicative of an interesting effect.  As will 
be discussed below, this is not to say that these effects are not possible to get, and future 
research should include a different procedure. 
Attitudes and Fluency 
 Perhaps the most important finding of this research outside of demonstrating the 
usefulness of implicit memory measures within the advertising context relates to the 
relationship between memory fluency and attitudes.  According to the MODE model 
(Fazio, 1990), automatically activated attitudes can determine behavior when there is a 
lack of motivation or opportunity.  As discussed earlier, many everyday consumer 
decisions lack motivation to perform great cognitive analysis.  Because of this, 
unconscious attitudes are likely to play an important role in purchase decisions.  
Understanding the processes that partially account for those attitudes is an important 
contribution of this research. 
Bornstein and D’Agostino’s (1992, 1994) perceptual fluency/attributional model 
predicts that fluency is affectively positive as long as participants are unaware of the 
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source of the fluency.  This model can be used to explain the mere exposure effect 
(Zajonc, 1968) wherein the simple act of being exposed to stimuli is enough to cause a 
subsequent increase in positive affect toward the stimulus materials.  Most of this 
research, though, has been conducted using stimuli that are novel to the participants.  For 
instance, Zajonc showed participants Chinese symbols and then later asked participants to 
affectively evaluate those as well as previously unseen symbols with the results being 
that the previously encountered Chinese symbols were generally liked more despite the 
participants having no ability to recall which they had seen.   
 Zajonc’s (1968) mere exposure effect fits in nicely with the perceptual 
fluency/attributional model.  Because the Chinese symbols are unknown to the 
participants, the fluency that is gained is perceptual in nature, as only surface feature 
analysis is really being done on the objects.  Therefore, it would seem that increases in 
perceptual fluency lead to increases of positive affect.  Unclear from the past literature, 
though, was the relationship between conceptual fluency and affect. 
 The present research was unique in that it involved known and familiar brands, as 
opposed to abstract objects such as Chinese symbols or novel brand names, which is what 
most past consumer research has typically used in order to investigate the mere exposure 
effect.  Results from this research suggest that when it comes to fluency and attitudes, 
conceptual fluency is important and contributes significantly to changes in affect, 
whereas perceptual fluency does not.  The lack of significance for the perceptual fluency 
was a bit unexpected due to the research that has emphasized its importance.  However, 
because the evaluations in this present research were conducted with known brands, it is 
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possible that a change in perceptual fluency is not sufficient to cause any change in 
attitudes. 
 These results conform well with Jacoby and Kelley’s (1987) conceptualization of 
memory being capable of being used as an object or as a tool.  When used as a tool, the 
focus is on the present task at hand and memory works to unconsciously influence 
behavior.  In the present research, those who treated memory as a tool focused on the 
attitude questions only and their memory—with increased conceptual fluency—guided 
their judgments.  On the other hand, those who were aware of the connection between the 
tasks used memory as an object to be searched, helping them to understand the source of 
their conceptual fluency, which in turn helped to discount any increase in positive affect. 
 The correlation between conceptual fluency and attitudes found in this study 
suggest that Bornstein and D’Agnostino’s (1992) model could be renamed and 
conceptualized, dropping the perceptual aspect and focusing instead on fluency and 
attribution.  After all, the results from the conceptual aspect of the experiment fit well 
with their model. 
 These results also further corroborate the importance of conceptually driven 
implicit memory measures.  As discussed above, it makes sense that conceptual implicit 
measures would be a more important outcome variable, as it is hard to imagine a time 
when being able to perceptually identify a word faster would really be that crucial.  
Having only conceptual fluency correlate with attitudes would further demonstrate that 
they are the more appropriate implicit memory measure to be using, at least in consumer 
research. 
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 The importance of this conceptual fluency becomes even greater when looking at 
the correlations between attitudes and all of the other memory measures.  No other 
memory measure, whether explicit or implicit in nature, correlated significantly with 
attitudes.  This is particularly important because conceptual explicit memory 
performance, which would also relate to a type of conceptual fluency, did not correlate 
with attitudes.  Conceptual explicit measures are by far the most common in advertising 
and communication research, yet these also demonstrated no relationship with attitudes.   
 Part of this null effect for explicit conceptual fluency could lie with the fact that 
participants were aware that they had been exposed to advertisements of these brands 
earlier in the experiment.  This could have two possible effects.  One, it could cause 
general annoyance by the participants in having to do an attitude measurement for brands 
they just saw and therefore rate the brands slightly lower than they would have otherwise.  
Similarly, they may attempt to discount their attitudes toward the brands because of that 
previous exposure.  In either case, they would counteract whatever positive gains may 
have occurred due to ad exposure by rating the brands less than they would have if they 
had been unaware. 
 Indeed, there is some support for this idea, as it would appear that an effect 
similar to the sleeper effect may have occurred.  In a typical sleeper effect paradigm, 
participants are given arguments or information from a low credibility source.  Over time, 
they forget the source and only remember the arguments, which results in their beginning 
to believe the arguments.  This is contrasted with when they are aware of the source, in 
which case they are not persuaded by the messages.  Although time is typically seen as an 
important element of the sleeper effect, Jacoby, Kelley, Brown, and Jasechko (1989) 
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argued that it was not that time caused participants to forget the source; rather, time 
caused participants to not think back to the source and rather just use memory as a tool to 
influence attitudes.  In that way, the sleeper effect can be thought of as being driven by 
awareness rather than memory decay. 
With that in mind, a similar effect could have occurred here.  For conceptual 
implicit fluency and attitudes, the correlation was strong for those who were test 
unaware, whereas there was no correlation for those who were test aware.  This suggests 
that when the participants were aware of the connection between the attitude questions 
and the ad exposure, they would discount any gains in positive affect associated with the 
brands.  A sleeper effect, then, is being seen, as only for those who were not aware of the 
connection—that is, those who were not thinking of the source of the message and were 
therefore using memory as a tool rather than an object—was a correlation shown between 
fluency and attitudes.   
 After having conducted the mediation and moderation analysis, it was clear that 
there is an interesting and complex relationship among exposure, conceptual fluency, and 
overall attitudes.  Results of the mediation analysis would suggest that the effect of 
advertisement exposure on attitudes was significantly mediated by implicit conceptual 
fluency.  In other words, the effect of advertisement exposure on attitudes worked 
through implicit memory such that ad exposure influenced conceptual implicit memory 
performance, which in turn influenced attitudes toward the brands in the ads.   
Results from the mediation analysis also seemed to detect a suppression effect.  
The direct effect of ad exposure on attitudes was not significant when implicit memory 
was not taken into account; however, with the effects of implicit memory added to the 
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equation, the path between ad exposure and attitudes became significant—and negative.  
In other words, once the effect of advertising exposure working through implicit memory 
to affect attitudes was taken into account, the remaining effect of ad exposure on attitudes 
was negative.  In essence, the positive effect of ad exposure on attitudes working through 
implicit memory and the negative effect of ad exposure on attitudes cancel each other out 
when not specifically parsed out, which is why the main effect was not initially 
significant. 
It is interesting that exposure to an ad actually led to more negative attitudes 
toward the brands in the ad.  Speculatively, it would appear that asking participants to 
participate in some sort of “brand awareness” task (either the brand generation or word 
fragment completion) followed by a set of attitude measures created a scenario wherein 
participants rated brands generally more negatively.  However, this effect was not large 
enough that the fluency attributed to the previous exposure could not still play an 
important role in causing more positive attitudes. 
Upon reflection, although the mediation analysis is significant and makes sense, it 
is possible that rather than conceptual fluency mediating the relationship between 
exposure and attitudes, exposure is moderating the relationship between conceptual 
fluency and attitudes.  According to regression analysis, this case could certainly be 
made.  Without any exposure to the advertisement, there were no differences in attitudes 
between those low in fluency and those who were high.  However, for those who were 
high in fluency, there were significant differences such that increases in conceptual 
fluency led to increases in positive attitudes.  In this way, the presence or absence of the 
advertisement is moderating the relationship between conceptual fluency and attitudes. 
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Therefore, it would appear that conceptual fluency, as indicated by performance 
on a conceptual implicit memory test, significantly correlates with attitudes and is 
moderated by ad exposure.  This relationship can only be found for conceptual implicit 
memory; perceptual implicit memory and all explicit measures showed no relationship 
with attitudes.  This further builds the case that future research should begin to adopt or at 
least consider using conceptual implicit memory measures.   
Limitations and Future Research 
 Although every effort was made to ensure the best possible design, a number of 
limitations should be acknowledged.  The first relates to the nature of the participants 
themselves.  The sample was entirely composed of undergraduate students and was 
predominately female.  Although there is no reason to believe that the processing effects 
that were being investigated in this research should be age or gender specific, it would 
still be desirable to have a more diverse sample.  By using two different populations of 
undergraduate students, it was at the very least possible to say that the results are not 
location specific.  Future research would do well to include a wider range and variety of 
participants. 
 The number of participants, at times, also caused issues.  Although it was a 
sizable overall group, once the participants were divided into their respective conditions, 
there were only about 15 to 20 individuals per cell.  This number became even smaller 
once those who were test aware were removed.  It would have been preferable to have a 
few more participants in order to increase the chances of always finding significant 
differences. 
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 Another potential limitation relates to the artificial nature of certain components 
of the research design.  The first of these issues is that the websites at which participants 
were looking were only screenshots.  Although these were screenshots from actual 
websites, using screenshots still creates an artificial web environment.  It is, obviously, 
unusual to look at a website and not be able to click on any of the links or be able to 
scroll down the page.  Future research, when looking to use online advertisements, would 
be greatly served by creating environments that are most like what users experience in 
everyday life. 
 A second artificial aspect of this research is that the encoding manipulations were 
caused entirely by instructions.  Although this appeared to work well, it is an artificial 
manipulation.  After all, individuals are never given instructions on how to look at a 
webpage whenever they are surfing the internet on their own time. 
 Finding ways to manipulate the formal structure of the advertisement in order to 
induce different types of processing is one major line of future research.  In advertising 
research, the ultimate goal is to establish the most effective ways to persuade the target 
audience.  Although it would be nice to be able to literally tell the audience how to 
encode a message, that is never going to happen.  Instead, it is possible to try to explore 
ways to change the features of the message in order to induce the type of processing in 
which you are interested. 
 Thinking first about advertisements embedded on websites, a number of different 
formal features could be manipulated in order to attract attention to the ad so that it is 
encoded.  One popular way is to have the advertisement contain animation.  Past research 
has suggested that animated ads lead to better recall of ad content (Li & Bukovac, 1999).  
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Therefore, future research could vary the level of animation on an embedded ad in order 
to determine if animation presence can change both whether and how the advertisement 
is encoded, which should translate as differences on memory measures. 
 The degree to which the advertisement is tailored to the specific individual as well 
as how well it fits with the website could also be important manipulations.  Past research 
has suggested that individuals may respond more favorably to advertisements when the 
ads activate in-group salience (Forehand, Deshpande, & Reed, 2002) and participants 
prefer websites that are highly personalized (Kalynaraman & Sundar, 2006).  These both 
could be important areas for future research.  For instance, for the undergraduate students 
at Syracuse University, it is possible that they would pay more attention and encode 
differently an ad based on the degree to which it was making them feel personally 
connected (e.g., generic ad—no connection; ad to college students—some connection; ad 
to Syracuse students—high connection).   
Similarly, relevancy has been shown to be important in attitude formation for 
internet search portals (Kalyanaraman & Ivory, 2009).  It is possible, then, that if the ad is 
relevant to what participants are looking for or relevant to the webpage more generally, 
attitudes could be more favorable toward the brand than when the ad is not congruent.  
Varying the level of congruence, then, might be another formal feature that could be 
manipulated. 
Of course, embedded advertisements on websites are but one vehicle for 
delivering an ad.  Future research could explore how different media are able to 
differentially have information encoded.  Are the results of the product placement studies 
mentioned above truly being driven by different types of encoding of the products?  
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Using both a conceptual and a perceptual implicit memory measure might begin to 
investigate that question.   
In an interesting recent study looking at memory for television commercials, 
Brasel and Gips (2008) used eye-tracking software to determine where viewers of 
television were looking when fast-forwarding through commercials.  Their results 
suggest that viewers pay considerable attention while fast-forwarding and that their 
attention is focused on the center of the screen.  This makes sense: When fast-forwarding 
through commercials, individuals have to pay careful attention to the screen in order to 
hit “play” when the regular program returns.  The research of Brasel and Gips suggests 
that having brand information centered on the screen would operate in a similar way, as 
the simple ads used in the present research and could positively affect attitudes, 
presumably due to an increase in fluency.  Future research could determine whether fast-
forwarding through commercials but having a clearly visible brand logo would increase 
the conceptual or perceptual fluency of viewers. 
Of similar interest could be the recent introduction by Hulu.com to have the 
option for individuals to rate how “relevant” the ad was that was viewed before watching 
any of its content.  Advertisements on services like Hulu are unique in that they are short 
and have to be watched before the main content can be viewed.  In an effort to make the 
commercials more personal, Hulu added the “relevant” measure so that the site can only 
show commercials that the viewer feels are relevant to his or her life.  However, results 
from this present research would suggest that making a simple relevancy judgment, 
which is conceptual in nature, would mean that the brand was encoded conceptually.  
Although having this option to rate the ad might have been intended to tailor messages to 
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each audience member, a potentially stronger outcome might be that it increases the 
conceptual fluency of the brand, which in turn may influence attitudes.  Future research 
could explore the effectiveness of those types of ads. 
 Another important research question that would build on the current results would 
be to explore whether there are specific mode effects.  Research in cognitive psychology 
has typically shown that priming results are mode specific (Roediger, 1990), meaning 
that receiving a message via audio does not translate to priming in a more visual setting.  
It could be important, then, to determine what the most effective media outlet would be 
for an ad’s message.  If someone hears an ad in a car right before going into the grocery 
store, is that more or less effective than simply seeing a poster for the same brand as that 
individual walks into the store?  It is possible that visual ads would translate into much 
stronger priming—a topic worth exploring. 
By continuing to vary the type of encoding, future research could also continue to 
explore the differences between conceptual and perceptual fluency and whether and when 
one better predicts attitudes.  This present research suggests that conceptual fluency 
mediates the relationship between ad exposure and attitudes; however, prior research 
outside the advertising context has found perceptual fluency to be important.  Future 
research could continue to determine when different types of fluency are important.   
 Also important to investigate is how long the prime can last.  Past research 
investigating implicit memory performance has suggested that the durability of the 
cognitive prime is much longer than a typical affective prime.  In fact, implicit memory 
measures have shown enhanced performance after an entire week has passed (Tulving, 
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Schacter, & Stark, 1982).  An interesting question, then, is to see how long a prime with a 
known brand would last. 
 This question is particularly important when thinking about the many messages an 
individual receives in the course of a day.  Future research could explore what Bargh 
(2006) has termed “second generation” priming questions.  If we know that showing the 
ad for Nike or Adidas primes those brand names, what happens when both are shown to 
participants?  In other words, which “prime” wins?  Or would they simply cancel each 
other out? 
 The answer to that question could, in part, rely on various moderators that could 
play an important role in determining the effectiveness of a prime.  For instance, 
familiarity has been used as a moderator in past advertising research (Coates, Butler, & 
Berry, 2006).  Could brand familiarity moderate the effectiveness of the prime, therein 
setting up a mediation-moderation model of advertising effectiveness? 
 A final limitation and area for future research that obviously must be mentioned 
relates to attention.  The attention manipulation in this present research almost entirely 
failed to operate as anticipated.  This failure was, presumably, due to the fact that the 
attention division task could not override the instructions that participants were 
following.  By not having an attentional divide, some key hypotheses were not able to be 
fully addressed. 
 Future research should return to explore attention further.  This could be done in 
two ways: a) research that explores ways to capture attention, and b) research that 
continues to investigate the effects of dividing attention on encoding and later memory 
performance.  The former issue has been discussed above, as changing the formal 
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features of an ad or website presumably is an attempt to change the degree of attention 
paid to an advertisement.  The latter exploration of the effects of divided attention should 
not be too difficult knowing to avoid the current missteps.   
 It is possible that the simple task of removing the encoding manipulation and 
keeping the 5-digit recall manipulation would be sufficient to divide attention.  
Additionally, it is possible that creating two groups, an intentional and an unintentional 
memory group, would provide the necessary manipulation as has been done so often in 
the psychology field. 
 Another task that could prove an effective way to divide attention is to create a 
concurrent task that must be completed at the same time as the task of interest.  A 
common example is to create a monitoring task wherein participants are constantly 
monitoring a second channel in order to detect changes.  Participants could monitor a 
second screen that displays digits that are constantly changing with the participants 
having to hit a key each time the number is odd.  This forces the participant to pay 
significant attention to the secondary task at the cost of the primary task.  Creating a 
second task like this would ensure that attention is being taken away from the primary 
task of looking at the advertisements.  This could be particularly effective if combined 
with the intentional/unintentional manipulation mentioned above. 
 Another approach that could prove interesting is to not give specific instructions 
to the participants but instead use eye tracking software to determine the amount of time 
and presumably attention that was paid to an advertisement.  In this way, an attempt 
could be made to use attention more as a continuous variable in order to determine what 
the relationship is between amount of attention and memory measures. 
       
 
100 
 Finally, future endeavors could also use behavioral measures as the key dependent 
variable.  Although it is nice to be able to demonstrate that implicit memory performance 
correlates with attitudes, an even better outcome—especially from the perspective of 
advertising—is to demonstrate that there could be actual changes in behavior.  Although 
the designs of these types of experiments can be tricky, behavioral outcomes have been 
used in consumer behavior research in the past (e.g., Strauss, Doyle, & Kreipe, 1994) and 
so trying to determine the relationship between fluency and behavior could be fruitful. 
Conclusion 
 When thinking about what influences everyday purchase decisions, many possible 
factors could get someone to pick Orbit out of the sea of gum possibilities.  One thing 
clear from past research, though, is that when motivation is low to carefully think about 
the decision, automatically activated attitudes tend to carry a lot of influence (Fazio, 
1990).  It is important to try to determine what processes underlie those automatically 
activated attitudes and how they can be changed. 
Based on the results from this research, one pathway to investigate is the mediated 
relationship between ad exposure and attitudes, with conceptual fluency acting as the 
mediator.  If increases in conceptual fluency translate into more positive attitudes, it 
would suggest that understanding the best and most efficient way to increase that fluency 
would be an effective strategy for marketers and advertisers to explore.  This research has 
only begun to look into these issues.  Future research will build upon these results by 
further investigating the role of perceptual and conceptual fluency within different 
communication settings.    
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Tables 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for Implicit Conceptual Memory Measures in Experimental Groups 
 
Brand   M SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Levis 
  
0.42 0.50 0.33 -1.94 
Caribou 0.14 0.35 2.16 2.71 
Ashley 0.32 0.47 0.79 -1.40 
Scope 0.38 0.49 0.53 -1.76 
Jared 0.35 0.48 0.63 -1.64 
Staples 0.55 0.50 -0.19 -2.01 
Swatch 0.27 0.45 1.04 -0.94 
Dial 0.25 0.44 1.17 -0.63 
Verizon 0.61 0.49 -0.47 -1.82 
Orbit 0.48 0.50 0.09 -2.04 
Chase 0.11 0.32 2.48 4.23 
Payless 0.36 0.48 0.58 -1.71 
Enterprise 0.33 0.47 0.74 -1.49 
Seventeen 0.23 0.42 1.32 -0.25 
Universal 0.36 0.48 0.58 -1.71 
Overall   0.34 0.14 0.28 -0.22 
Note: Each variable was calculated as a percent of the responses that generated each 
brand name first, with a possible range of 0 (=brand never generated first) to 1 (=brand 
always generated first).  N = 91. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics for Implicit Conceptual Memory Measures in Control Group 
 
Brand   M SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Caribou 
  
0.21 0.41 1.48 0.20 
Dial 0.13 0.34 2.27 3.33 
Jared 0.16 0.37 1.95 1.92 
Orbit 0.11 0.31 2.68 5.46 
Ashley 0.13 0.34 2.27 3.33 
Chase 0.18 0.39 1.70 0.93 
Enterprise 0.29 0.46 0.97 -1.13 
Levis 0.47 0.51 0.11 -2.10 
Payless 0.37 0.49 0.57 -1.77 
Scope 0.32 0.47 0.83 -1.39 
Seventeen 0.11 0.31 2.68 5.46 
Staples 0.21 0.41 1.48 0.20 
Swatch 0.08 0.27 3.25 9.05 
Universal 0.26 0.45 1.12 -0.79 
Verizon 0.37 0.49 0.57 -1.77 
Overall   0.18 0.10 0.33 -0.41 
Note: Each variable was calculated as a percent of the responses that generated each 
brand name first, with a possible range of 0 (=brand never generated first) to 1 (=brand 
always generated first).  N = 27. 
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics for Explicit Conceptual Memory Measures in Experimental Groups 
 
Brand   M SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Levis 
  
0.74 0.44 -1.13 -0.75 
Orbit 0.76 0.43 -1.25 -0.46 
Payless 0.70 0.46 -0.92 -1.20 
Universal 0.87 0.34 -2.27 3.27 
Jared 0.69 0.47 -0.82 -1.38 
Swatch 0.57 0.50 -0.31 -1.98 
Enterprise 0.50 0.50 0.00 -2.08 
Ashley 0.93 0.26 -3.35 9.55 
Scope 0.76 0.43 -1.25 -0.46 
Dial 0.74 0.44 -1.13 -0.75 
Caribou 0.83 0.38 -1.84 1.44 
Verizon 0.83 0.38 -1.84 1.44 
Staples 0.57 0.50 -0.31 -1.98 
Chase 0.65 0.48 -0.64 -1.66 
Seventeen 0.93 0.26 -3.35 9.55 
Overall   0.73 0.19 -0.71 -0.06 
Note: Each variable was calculated as a percent of the respondents who correctly recalled 
each brand as being advertised earlier, with a possible range of 0 (=brand never correctly 
recalled) to 1 (=brand always correctly recalled).  N = 53. 
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Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics for Implicit Perceptual Memory Measures in Experimental Groups 
 
Brand   M SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Levis 
  
0.37 0.48 0.56 -1.72 
Orbit 0.65 0.48 -0.65 -1.61 
Payless 0.23 0.43 1.27 -0.39 
Universal 0.59 0.49 -0.38 -1.90 
Jared 0.18 0.39 1.66 0.77 
Swatch 0.01 0.10 9.90 98.00 
Enterprise 0.48 0.50 0.08 -2.04 
Ashley 0.16 0.37 1.85 1.45 
Scope 0.38 0.49 0.51 -1.77 
Dial 0.18 0.39 1.66 0.77 
Caribou 0.05 0.22 4.14 15.49 
Verizon 0.27 0.44 1.08 -0.85 
Staples 0.17 0.38 1.75 1.09 
Chase 0.24 0.43 1.20 -0.56 
Seventeen 0.30 0.46 0.89 -1.23 
Overall   0.28 0.14 0.30 -0.12 
Note: Each variable was calculated as a percent of the responses that correctly solved the 
word fragments, with a possible range of 0 (=no correct word fragment completions) to 1 
(=all word fragments correctly completed).  N = 88. 
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Table 5 
Descriptive Statistics for Implicit Perceptual Memory Measures in Control Group 
 
Brand   M SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Levis 
  
0.15 0.36 2.04 2.29 
Orbit 0.55 0.51 -0.19 -2.09 
Payless 0.09 0.29 2.98 7.34 
Universal 0.55 0.51 -0.19 -2.09 
Jared 0.21 0.42 1.48 0.19 
Swatch 0.00 0.00 . . 
Enterprise 0.36 0.49 0.59 -1.76 
Ashley 0.09 0.29 2.98 7.34 
Scope 0.33 0.48 0.74 -1.55 
Dial 0.15 0.36 2.04 2.29 
Caribou 0.03 0.17 5.74 33.00 
Verizon 0.27 0.45 1.07 -0.91 
Staples 0.15 0.36 2.04 2.29 
Chase 0.21 0.42 1.48 0.19 
Seventeen 0.22 0.43 1.46 0.14 
Overall   0.17 0.11 0.81 0.67 
Note: Each variable was calculated as a percent of the responses that correctly solved the 
word fragments, with a possible range of 0 (=no correct word fragment completions) to 1 
(=all word fragments correctly completed).  N = 28. 
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Table 6 
Descriptive Statistics for Explicit Perceptual Memory Measures in Experimental Groups 
 
Brand   M SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Levis 
  
0.64 0.49 -0.58 -1.72 
Orbit 0.82 0.39 -1.70 0.91 
Payless 0.38 0.49 0.50 -1.82 
Universal 0.71 0.46 -0.95 -1.15 
Jared 0.38 0.49 0.50 -1.82 
Swatch 0.11 0.31 2.58 4.82 
Enterprise 0.64 0.49 -0.58 -1.72 
Ashley 0.22 0.42 1.40 -0.03 
Scope 0.65 0.48 -0.67 -1.61 
Dial 0.51 0.50 -0.04 -2.08 
Caribou 0.18 0.39 1.70 0.91 
Verizon 0.45 0.50 0.19 -2.04 
Staples 0.49 0.50 0.04 -2.08 
Chase 0.25 0.44 1.16 -0.68 
Seventeen 0.55 0.50 -0.19 -2.04 
Overall   0.48 0.19 -0.21 0.62 
Note: Each variable was calculated as a percent of the respondents who correctly solved 
the word fragment, with a possible range of 0 (=brand never correctly recalled) to 1 
(=brand always correctly recalled).  N = 53. 
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Table 7 
Descriptive Statistics for Attitude Measures in Experimental Groups 
 
Brand M SD Skewness Kurtosis alpha 
Orbit 
  
6.06 1.25 -1.81 3.78 0.99 
Payless 3.88 1.52 0.06 -0.54 0.96 
Universal 6.01 1.04 -1.12 1.17 0.97 
Jared 4.22 1.46 0.01 -0.31 0.97 
Swatch 4.65 1.28 0.03 -0.34 0.98 
Enterprise 4.69 1.14 0.18 -0.12 0.97 
Ashley 3.96 1.24 -0.13 0.50 0.98 
Dial 4.81 1.41 -0.50 0.00 0.97 
Caribou 5.13 1.63 -0.81 0.03 0.97 
Verizon 5.46 1.60 -0.94 -0.03 0.98 
Staples 5.39 1.39 -0.95 0.53 0.98 
Chase 4.61 1.36 -0.09 0.12 0.99 
Levis 4.83 1.43 -0.36 -0.31 0.96 
Seventeen 4.87 1.71 -0.70 -0.36 0.98 
Scope 5.25 1.33 -0.58 -0.04 0.98 
Overall   4.95 0.60 0.26 0.63   
Note: Each attitude mean is the average of four attitude measures that are measured on 7-
point scales, with scores ranging from 1 ( = extreme negative evaluation of brand) to 7 
(extreme positive evaluation of brand). Alphas are the Cronbach’s alpha for the four 
items that make up each individual mean. N = 285. 
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Table 8 
Descriptive Statistics for Attitude Measures in Control Group (no memory measures 
completed) 
 
Brand M SD Skewness Kurtosis alpha 
Orbit   5.49 1.30 -0.58 -0.79 0.96 
Payless 3.82 1.47 -0.47 -0.74 0.95 
Universal 5.46 1.14 -0.52 0.28 0.96 
Jared 4.29 1.38 -0.22 0.24 0.97 
Swatch 4.46 1.39 0.55 -0.31 0.98 
Enterprise 4.40 1.06 0.28 0.45 0.96 
Ashley 3.92 0.63 0.19 4.66 0.91 
Dial 4.81 1.31 -0.36 -0.26 0.97 
Caribou 5.16 1.44 -0.19 -1.03 0.96 
Verizon 5.18 1.63 -0.75 -0.29 0.98 
Staples 4.99 1.10 -0.61 0.31 0.96 
Chase 4.03 1.26 -0.16 0.68 0.98 
Levis 4.73 1.24 -0.70 0.23 0.96 
Seventeen 3.99 1.66 -0.06 -0.91 0.97 
Scope 5.01 1.42 -0.66 0.51 0.96 
Overall   4.65 0.51 -0.61 0.69   
Note: Each attitude mean is the average of four attitude measures that are measured on 7-
point scales, with scores ranging from 1 ( = extreme negative evaluation of brand) to 7 
(extreme positive evaluation of brand). Alphas are the Cronbach’s alpha for the four 
items that make up each individual mean. N = 35. 
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Table 9 
Descriptive Statistics for Attitude Measures in Control Group (implicit memory measures 
completed prior) 
 
Brand M SD Skewness Kurtosis alpha 
Orbit 
  
5.94 1.23 -1.24 1.22 0.96 
Payless 3.47 1.62 0.22 -1.00 0.95 
Universal 6.03 1.12 -0.84 -0.76 0.97 
Jared 4.48 1.60 -0.01 -0.53 0.99 
Swatch 4.50 1.40 -0.08 -0.63 0.97 
Enterprise 4.70 1.19 0.27 0.01 0.96 
Ashley 3.92 1.06 0.58 2.10 0.99 
Dial 4.49 1.62 -0.07 -0.51 0.99 
Caribou 3.66 1.12 -0.75 0.42 0.97 
Verizon 5.66 1.68 -1.48 1.77 0.97 
Staples 6.15 0.91 -0.79 -0.17 0.98 
Chase 5.12 1.54 -0.55 0.13 0.98 
Levis 4.83 1.70 -0.35 -0.79 0.98 
Seventeen 4.89 1.90 -0.56 -0.94 0.97 
Scope 5.27 1.20 -0.34 0.35 0.94 
Overall   4.87 0.47 -0.46 1.79   
Note: Each attitude mean is the average of four attitude measures that are measured on 7-
point scales, with scores ranging from 1 ( = extreme negative evaluation of brand) to 7 
(extreme positive evaluation of brand). Alphas are the Cronbach’s alpha for the four 
items that make up each individual mean. N = 285. 
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Table 10 
 
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Overall Attitudes 
Toward Brands (N=49) 
 
    Step 1       Step 2 
Variables 
 
B 
 
SE B 
 
β  
 
 
B 
 
SE B 
 
β 
 
Block 1 
 
      
Memory Performance 
 
2.20 .56 .55*  .23 .99 .06 
 
Exposure -.42 .15 -.38*  -1.05 .31 -.95*  
 
Block 2       
 
      
 
 
Memory X Exposure   
 
2.75 1.18 .95* 
 
Note.  Step 1: R2 = 0.27, F (2, 46) = 8.56, p < .01. Step 2: ∆R2 = .08, ∆F (1, 45) = 5.45, p 
< .05.  
*p < .05 
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Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1. Mediation model proposed where a represents the effect of exposure on 
conceptual implicit memory performance, b represents the effect of conceptual implicit 
memory performance on attitudes toward brands from the advertisements, c represents 
the direct effect of exposure on attitudes, and c’ represents the direct effect of exposure 
on attitudes adjusted for conceptual implicit memory performance.  The mediated effect 
would be the product of a and b. 
 
Figure 2. Results of simple slope analysis exploring the significant memory X exposure 
interaction predicting average attitudes toward brands. Exposure coded as 0 = no ad 
exposure, 1 = ad exposure. Memory entails participants’ performance on conceptual 
implicit measures with a possible range from 0 = no implicit conceptual memory for 
brands to 1 = total conceptual memory for brands.  Lines anchored at minimum (= 0) and 
maximum (= 1) exposure scores. 
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Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Implicit Memory 
Performance 
a b 
c, c’ 
Attitudes toward brands Advertisement 
Exposure 
       
 
113 
Figure 2 
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Appendix A 
 
 
Thank you for participating in our studies.  To 
make sure we keep track of your data while 
protecting your confidentiality, we’ll assign you 
an ID Number for the course of this study.  You 
will be asked to enter it into a both 
questionnaires.   Please only enter this ID 
number, not your PID, onyen, etc. 
 
Your participant ID is: 
M244 
 
 
 
Please read and sign the consent forms for all studies 
and turn them over and place them next to your 
computer.  
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Once you have signed the consent form please STOP 
here.  Wait until the experimenter has told you to 
begin the studies before scrolling down. 
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STUDY 1:   
News Website Usability 
The first study you will be participating in is looking to 
investigate how well different news websites are 
designed.  Specifically, we are interested in how 
focusing on different types of tasks while looking for 
specific features on a website impacts your views of 
them. 
To access this study, please click on the following link.  
Once you have completed the survey, you will be 
instructed to return to this document for further 
instructions. 
 
[SURVEY LINK HERE] 
 
Next, you will have the opportunity to design your own 
news website layout.  Open on this computer is an 
Adobe Illustrator file with your participant ID number 
as the name of the file.  Please click on that open file 
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that can be found on the task bar below and follow the 
instructions on that screen.  Once you have completed 
that task, you can return to this document to scroll 
down to the final research study. 
 
DO NOT CONTINUE TO THE NEXT STUDY UNTIL YOU 
HAVE COMPLETED THE TASK IN ADOBE ILLUSTRATOR!! 
 
 
 
 
 
STUDY  2:   Brand Attitudes 
The second study you will be participating in today is 
looking to investigate what brands college students are 
most familiar with as well as your attitudes toward a 
few important brands.  Please click on the following 
link, which will take you to the survey: 
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[SURVEY LINK HERE] 
 
 
 
 
Thank you very much for your participation.  This is 
the end of the survey.  Please gather your possessions 
and exit quietly, remembering to sign your name on 
the participation sheet found at the front of the 
classroom before leaving. 
 
 
  
       
 
119 
Appendix B 
 
Script for Research Facilitator 
 
Thank you for being here today.  You are about to take part in two separate research 
studies.  The first is going to be getting your opinions about the layouts of different news 
websites.  The second is going to be looking at how popular different brands are among 
college students.  Before we begin, the first thing you need to do is read through and sign 
the informed consent form that was at your desk when you sat down.  Please carefully 
read through this form and, if you have no questions, sign the form.  By signing the form, 
you are indicating that you have read it, have no questions, and are willing to participate.  
Does anyone have any questions about this? 
 
[Once everyone has signed the consent form, continue:] 
 
Thank you.  I am now going to tell you a little about the studies you are participating in 
so you will know what to do.  On each computer right now is an open Word document.  
In this Word document, you will find instructions and embedded links for what you are 
going to do. 
 
In a moment, when you are instructed to begin, you will open the Word document and 
click on the link labeled “Study One.”  That link will open a Web browser, which will 
contain the first part of the first study that you are completing.  In that Web browser, 
there will be instructions as to what you should do.  Briefly, you will be looking at 
different websites and assessing their overall usability. 
 
Once you are completed with the first part of the study, the instructions on the screen will 
tell you to close the Web browser and return to the Word document.  There, you will find 
instructions for the second part of the first study.  That will entail using the open Adobe 
Illustrator document that’s on the computer right now to design your own news website 
layout.   
 
Once you have completed your design, you will return to the Word document where you 
will find a link to the second study being conducted today.  Like the first one, it will open 
in a Web browser and have instructions on what you will be doing.  Please read the 
instructions carefully and answer all the questions the best you can.   
 
If at any point, you have any questions, raise your hand and I will come over as quickly 
as possible.  Otherwise, if there are no other questions, you are free to begin. 
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Appendix C 
 
General Procedure for the Distraction Task: 
 
Thank you very much for your responses so far.   
 
On the next few pages, you will find five different generic 
layouts for news websites.  
 
Please look at each layout and assume that the layout you 
are looking at is a news website. 
 
After looking at the layout, please answer the questions 
about it that can be found on the page after. 
 
Raise your hand if you have any questions about this task.  
Otherwise, feel free to continue.  
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LAYOUT ONE 
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QUESTIONS FOR LAYOUT ONE: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Overall, how visually appealing did you find this layout to be? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Overall, how “busy” did you find this layout to be? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Overall, how easy to navigate do you think a news website with that layout would be? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
How similar was this layout to other news websites that you’ve used? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
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LAYOUT TWO 
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QUESTIONS FOR LAYOUT TWO: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Overall, how visually appealing did you find this layout to be? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Overall, how “busy” did you find this layout to be? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
How similar was this layout to other news websites that you’ve used? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Overall, how easy to navigate do you think a news website with that layout would be? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
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LAYOUT THREE 
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QUESTIONS FOR LAYOUT THREE: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Overall, how visually appealing did you find this layout to be? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Overall, how “busy” did you find this layout to be? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Overall, how easy to navigate do you think a news website with that layout would be? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
How similar was this layout to other news websites that you’ve used? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
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LAYOUT FOUR  
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QUESTIONS FOR LAYOUT FOUR: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Overall, how visually appealing did you find this layout to be? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Overall, how “busy” did you find this layout to be? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Overall, how easy to navigate do you think a news website with that layout would be? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
How similar was this layout to other news websites that you’ve used? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
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LAYOUT FIVE 
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QUESTIONS FOR LAYOUT FIVE: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Overall, how visually appealing did you find this layout to be? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Overall, how “busy” did you find this layout to be? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Overall, how easy to navigate do you think a news website with that layout would be? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
How similar was this layout to other news websites that you’ve used? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
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Thank you! 
Next, you will have the opportunity to design 
your own news website layout.  Open on this 
computer is an Adobe Illustrator file with your 
participant ID number as the name of the file.  
Please click on that open file that can be found 
on the task bar below and follow the instructions 
on that screen.  Once you have completed that 
task, you can return to this document to scroll 
down to the final research study. 
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Appendix D 
 
Sample Stimulus Materials 
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Appendix E 
 
List of Brands to be used in study 
 
Brand (category) % Produced First in Category 
Exemplar Task 
% Completion of Word 
Fragment 
Southwest (airlines) 21 13.3 
Payless (shoe stores) 21 16.7 
Jared (jewelers) 21 10 
Camel (cigarettes) 21 23.3 
Levis (jeans) 21 16.7 
Seventeen (magazine) 14 16.7 
Shell (gas station) 7 23.3 
Enterprise (rental car) 14 26.7 
Ashley (furniture) 7 6.67 
Dial (soap) 4 33.3 
Caribou (coffee) 7 13.3 
Chase (credit card) 7 23.3 
Staples (office supply) 45 23.3 
Orbit (gum) 21 56.7 
Scope (mouthwash) 31 20 
 
  
       
 
135 
Appendix F 
 
Awareness Questionnaire  
 
Question 1: 
What do you think the purpose of this task was? 
 
Question 2: 
When you were producing examples to the categories, did you think there was anything unusual 
about the categories or the examples that you produced? 
 
Question 3: 
Did you notice any connection between the companies/products you rated a few minutes ago in 
the other room and the task you just performed? If so, what did you notice? 
 
Question 4: 
If you were aware of a connection between the products/companies you rated earlier and the task 
you just performed, were you aware of this connection when you were producing the examples, 
or did you only become aware of it after I began to ask you these questions? 
 
Question 5: 
If you noticed that some of the product categories corresponded to the companies presented 
earlier, did you intentionally try to use words from the earlier part of the experiment as examples 
for the presented categories? 
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